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1 Introduction
Transfer taxation has long been a highly controversial issue. Except for a brief period of time,
the US government has maintained a positive bequest tax ever since it was first introduced
in 1916. The tax was eliminated in 2010 and reintroduced in 2011. The nature of the policy
debate, however, seems to go in only one direction: in all developed countries, we indeed
observe either zero or positive taxation of parental transfers.1
This regularity on observed tax systems around the world contrasts with the lack of a
clean theoretical justification for a positive tax on bequests from an efficiency point of view.
In virtually all traditional models of bequests, efficiency calls for either zero or a negative tax
on parental transfers.2 Perhaps the most widely analyzed model of bequest taxation is the
altruistic model, where the motive for bequests comes from the assumption that parents
care about their children’s welfare. A maintained assumption in the altruistic model is that
different generations agree about intertemporal trade-offs. The implication of the standard
altruistic model for intergenerational wealth transfers - such as bequests and inter vivos - is
simple. An altruistic parent knows that the offspring will save according to his optimal plan,
which is also optimal from the parent’s point of view. As a result, parents do not have any
paternalistic concerns regarding the offspring’s savings choice and the whole dynasty acts as
if it is a single individual (e.g., Bernheim (1989)). If the society cares only about the parent’s
welfare directly, this would imply that parental transfers are socially optimal and should
remain undistorted, given that there are no other reasons for taxation such as redistribution
or financing government expenditures. Following the same arguments, whenever society
attaches direct welfare weight to future generations, parental transfers should actually be
subsidized according to the altruistic model with intergenerational agreement.3
However, disagreements are common to most, if not all, parent-offspring relationships.
Clarke, Preston, Raksin, and Bengtson (1999) study a wide range of disagreement patterns
1Estate tax rates in the United States have varied since the time they were introduced in 1916. For detailed
information on the evolution of estate taxes in the United States, see Jacobson, Raub, and Johnson (2007). On
January 1, 2013, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 was passed which permanently set an exemption
level of 5 million US dollars, with a maximum tax rate of 40% for the year 2013 and beyond. In the United King-
dom, the inheritance tax rate has held steady at 40%. The exemption level in the United Kingdom is 325,000
pounds. For detailed information on the UK inheritance tax system, visit https://www.gov.uk/inheritance-
tax. For an overview on parental transfer taxation in OECD countries, see Cremer and Pestieau (2011).
2We discuss these models and their implications for bequest taxation in detail in the related literature sec-
tion.
3See Kaplow (1995) and Farhi and Werning (2010) for a discussion of optimality of bequest subsidies under
social preferences that weigh future generations directly.
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between older parents and adult children and develop a typology of disagreement issues.
They consider a random sample of 496 parents (average age 62) and 641 children (average
age 39) and ask about possible sources of disagreement.4 More than 70% of the respondents
report disagreements (about the same percentage among children and parents). The largest
category of responses about conflict (38% among parents and 30% among children) is la-
beled as “Habits and Lifestyle Choices,” and it includes sexual activity/orientation, living
arrangements, quality of life, and allocation of resources and/or education. A conclusion the
authors reach about this category of conflicts is that intertemporal allocation of resources is
a common source of intergenerational disagreement. The following quote summarizes the
point:
“There are also conflicts that seem to express a world view common to many in the older gener-
ation. This same father writes: ‘He [39] wants all things like his generation of baby boomers, right
now - new cars, new houses, vacations - all of it on one income and that a blue collar job income.‘
This is echoed elsewhere in another father’s (60) comment over his daughter’s (37) lack of ‘concern for
saving something for a rainy day.’ Another father (71) reports that his son’s (37) ‘using credit cards
to the limit‘ is an area of disagreement.”
In this paper, we analyze optimal taxation of parental transfers in a world in which par-
ents and offspring disagree on the intertemporal allocation of resources. We show that there
is a genuine efficiency reason for government intervention in the market in the presence of
intergenerational disagreement. In particular, we find that, whenever offspring are impa-
tient from their parents’ perspective, optimal intervention involves a positive tax on parental
transfers.
We study transfer taxation using an intergenerational model in which bequests are mo-
tivated by altruism. The key principle for efficient bequest taxation can be fully grasped
in the baseline model where agents live for two periods. In the first period, people make
consumption-saving decisions, and in the second period, they choose how much to con-
sume and bequeath to their offspring. Then, they are replaced by their offspring who go
through the same life cycle. We model disagreement in a way that minimally departs from
the standard model: a parent and an offspring agree on everything except for how the off-
spring should allocate his resources between his young and old age.
4The exact question was: “No matter how well two people get along, there are times they disagree or get annoyed
about something. In the last few years, what are some things on which you have differed, disagreed, or been disappointed
about (even if not openly discussed) with your child (or parent)?”
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In this environment, we first characterize laissez-faire market equilibrium. We focus
on Markov equilibria.5 Using this characterization, we prove that equilibrium allocation
is Pareto inefficient. The inefficiency stems from the fact that, as long as there is disagree-
ment between parents and offspring, the latter do not fully internalize the consequences of
their saving decisions on the former.
Having uncovered an efficiency reason to intervene in the market outcome, we next char-
acterize optimal policy. We begin our analysis of optimal policy by focusing on a particular
Pareto-efficient allocation that we call the “Ramsey” allocation. In this allocation, all the
welfare weight is on the initial parent, and future generations are valued by society only in-
directly via the initial parent’s welfare. The Ramsey allocation is probably the most widely
adopted benchmark in the literature. This choice of the benchmark efficient allocation is
further motivated by the fact that in the standard model with no disagreements, a Ramsey
government would find it optimal not to distort the equilibrium transfer decisions of par-
ents at all. In this sense, any need for an intervention in the case with intergenerational
disagreements comes from nowhere else but the existence of disagreements.
We find that, if children are less patient than what their parents want them to be, then
it is optimal for the government to correct parents’ bequest decisions through a positive
bequest tax. The intuition is as follows. Because of disagreement, the offspring save less
than what their parents prefer. In particular, the parental welfare goes up if the parent can
make the offspring increase his savings, which is possible by increasing bequests as long as
the offspring’s optimal saving policy is increasing in the amount of bequests received. As a
result, bequeathing has an additional marginal benefit for the parents relative to the Ramsey
planner. This is why it is optimal to distort parent’s bequest decision.
The Ramsey allocation can be implemented as follows. In order to make children save
the amount dictated by the Ramsey allocation, the government uses subsidies on savings
and uses lump-sum taxes to finance these subsidies. However, from the perspective of the
parents, who take the savings subsidy as given, their offspring are still undersaving under
the new - subsidized - interest rate. In other words, since parents take the lump-sum tax
as given, they do not internalize the fact that the subsidy is there to discipline the saving
behavior of the next generation and does not actually change the gross return to their off-
springs’ savings. As a result, parents transfer too much to their offspring, and hence, should
5We cannot rule out the existence of multiple equilibria, but importantly, all our results are valid for all
Markov equilibria.
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be taxed. Even though we find the case in which children are impatient from their parents’
perspective more natural, we also analyze the case in which they act more patiently than
what their parents would like, and we find that bequests should be subsidized in that case.
Next, we generalize our results to the whole Pareto frontier by analyzing optimal be-
quest taxation in the case in which society cares directly about future generations. The
Pareto-optimal bequest tax can be decomposed between an “efficiency component” and an
“intergenerational redistribution component”. The efficiency component is the same as the
Ramsey bequest tax: it is only present when there is intergenerational disagreement and
calls for a tax whenever offspring are impatient from their parents’ perspective. The second
component, also present in models without intergenerational disagreements, represents a
subsidy to parental transfers arising whenever the planner attaches a direct weight on future
generations. The overall sign of the bequest tax depends on whether the efficiency wedge or
the intergenerational redistribution wedge dominates. It is important, though, to stress that
as long as offspring are impatient from their parents’ perspective, the efficiency component
is positive for any Pareto-efficient allocation and, hence, calls for a tax on parental transfers.
Our results extend to the case in which agents live for an arbitrary number of periods
and parents coexist with their offspring. The optimal tax on inter vivos transfers obeys the
same principles as the bequest tax and, thus, has the same sign. We also study the role of
horizontal (cross-sectional) income heterogeneity by embedding our model into an optimal
labor income taxation framework a` la Mirrlees (1971). We find that although the optimality
of a positive bequest tax is still dictated by the presence of intergenerational disagreements,
the horizontal redistribution motive shapes the curvature of the tax schedule. In particu-
lar, when the income process is mean reverting across generations and society puts direct
welfare weight on the offspring, the optimal bequest tax rate typically increases with the
amount of the bequests. The progressivity of bequest taxes stems from a mechanism similar
to that in Farhi and Werning (2010), except that they find that optimality calls for progres-
sive subsidies on bequests and not taxes. This is because they do not model intergenerational
disagreement, the key driving force for bequest taxation in our analysis.
In addition to its policy implications, this paper also makes a methodological contribu-
tion by deriving normative implications of models with intergenerational disagreements in
the absence of differentiability assumptions. Our results are presented over three levels of
analysis. In the public finance literature, it is customary to compare equilibrium and efficient
allocations by defining and measuring wedges that represent discrepancies between the op-
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timality conditions that the equilibrium and the efficient allocations satisfy. In addition to
providing expressions for optimal wedges (which requires the assumption of differentia-
bility of the policy functions) and optimal linear taxes (which requires further restrictive
assumptions implying concavity of agents’ problems), we determine the sign of optimal
wedges without imposing any regularity conditions on the policy functions. Deriving nor-
mative prescriptions at this level of generality is particularly important for models with dis-
agreements for at least two reasons. First, it is well known that, in general, these models may
not have equilibria with differentiable policy functions.6 Second, even when a differentiable
equilibrium exists, models with multiple selves often admit multiple (Markov) equilibria. It
is important in such cases to understand whether a policy implication emerges from a gen-
eral principle or instead is linked to a specific equilibrium (or equilibrium property such as
differentiability or linearity of the policy).
In our implementation result, we show that when we focus our attention on linear Markov
equilibria, the parental transfer wedge translates into a result on transfer taxation: efficient
allocations can be implemented using linear wealth transfer taxes as long as the government
has access to (linear) life-cycle saving subsidies to offset offsprings’ tendency to undersave.
We also show that the linear Markov equilibria assumption is innocuous by proving that,
under the constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution utility function (CEIS), such equi-
libria exist. It is important to note that the linear structure of taxes is not crucial for the
optimality of bequest taxes. As long as the saving subsidy applied to offspring leaves their
saving policy function strictly monotone in the amount of transfers they receive, it is optimal
to tax bequests.
Related Literature. This paper is related to three strands of literature. The first is the
literature on optimal taxation of bequests and inter vivos transfers.7 Our contribution here is
to provide a novel, pure efficiency argument for taxing parental transfers.8 In addition to the
altruistic model that is already discussed, a widely used model of bequests is the warm-glow
(or “joy of giving”) model. In this model too, the optimal bequest tax is zero or negative (i.e.,
a subsidy), depending on whether society cares about the offspring directly (e.g., Kopczuk
6Our model with intergenerational disagreements has an analytical structure that is quite similar to models
with present-bias problems a` la Laibson (1997), and it is well known that in these models, policy functions that
describe people’s life-cycle saving behavior may not be differentiable. See Harris and Laibson (2002).
7See Cremer and Pestieau (2011), Kaplow (2001), and Kopczuk (2009) for excellent surveys of the literature
on optimal transfer taxation.
8It is, of course, possible to justify taxation of parental transfers based on equality grounds when other
instruments of horizontal redistribution are limited. See, for instance, Piketty and Saez (2013).
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(2009)). Another framework considered in the literature is the model with exchange motives
for bequests. In this class of game-theoretical models, the normative predictions crucially
depend on the details of the game played between the parents and the offspring (e.g., Laitner
(1997)). Finally, we have the accidental bequests model, where taxing (accidental) bequests is
non-distortionary. According to this model, bequest taxes are simply a good way to finance
positive government expenditures when lump-sum taxes are not available. This model does
not imply an optimal positive tax, at least not in the way we define optimality in this paper.
Specifically, there is no equilibrium inefficiency to be corrected by taxes on bequests or gifts.9
Our paper is also related to the literature on intergenerational disagreements. A semi-
nal paper in this literature is Phelps and Pollak (1968), which analyzes equilibrium national
saving rate in an environment in which each generation lives for a single period and is
imperfectly altruistic: the rate at which each generation discounts the next generation’s con-
sumption relative to their own consumption is higher than the rate at which they discount
consumption across any two subsequent future generations. Assuming that people have
CEIS utility functions, returns to capital are linear and there is no depreciation, and focusing
only on the equilibrium in which all generations save the same constant fraction of their
income at all periods (i.e., a linear Markov equilibrium), the paper shows that equilibrium
entails lower national saving compared with that in the Ramsey allocation.10 Doepke and
Zilibotti (2014) analyze an environment in which parents and children have preference dis-
agreements, and parents can affect offspring’s choices in two ways: by influencing their
preferences via education and by imposing direct restrictions on their choice sets. They use
this model to explain the variation in parenting styles across industrialized countries and
over time. Finally, Doepke and Tertilt (2009) provide an economic rationale to the dramatic
improvements in the legal rights of married women that occurred before the introduction of
female suffrage. Their model features an intergenerational disagreement that is quite similar
to ours: fathers and son-in-laws disagree about the degree to which they care about the wel-
fare of their grandchildren (children respectively). In fact, this intergenerational disagree-
ment is one of the key channels through which the empowerement of women (daughters)
9An obvious theoretical assumption - not yet carefully tested empirically - would justify positive taxation
of all sorts of wealth (not only of parental wealth transfers). This is the assumption that wealth concentration
generates negative externalities. See Kopczuk (2009) for a discussion of negative wealth externalities.
10Following Strotz (1955), Laibson (1997) applies this framework to individual consumption saving problem
over the life cycle under self-control problems and also finds undersaving behavior. See O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999) for a more general application of this model to individual decision making.
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benefit men (fathers), and thus, give men incentives to carry out political reforms that lead
to improvements of women’s rights. We contribute to this growing literature by analyzing
the policy implications of intergenerational disagreements.
One possible interpretation of our positive model is that offspring agree with their par-
ents regarding how much they should save, but they face self-control problems that prevent
them from saving the right amount. Under this interpretation, the optimal tax problem is a
paternalistic one in the sense that taxes are used to correct the “wrong” saving behavior of
the offspring. This is the focus of a number of recent papers that have explored the implica-
tions of self-control problems for optimal taxation. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) analyze
a model of paternalistic taxation for unhealthy goods. In a recent work, Farhi and Gabaix
(2015) revisit several key results on optimal taxes using a fairly rich behavioral model which
allows for tax misperceptions, internalities, and mental accounting. More closely related
are Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2010) and Pavoni and Yazici (2015), both of which analyze
properties of linear taxes on life-cycle savings that implement the Ramsey allocation. The
current paper, on the other hand, does not assume that offsprings’ true welfare coincides
with that of their parents. The offspring are truly more impatient than what parents want
them to be. In this environment, we show that it is optimal to tax parental transfers. The op-
timality of bequest taxation does not stem from correcting people’s mistakes (because there
are none), but rather from an externality that arises from intergenerational disagreements.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model,
and Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium bequest behavior of parents in the absence of
government intervention. In Section 4, we compare equilibrium and Ramsey bequest be-
havior and provide a tax implementation of the Ramsey allocation. In Section 5, we provide
a number of important generalizations of our result, including the Pareto-efficient taxation
of parental transfers and the taxation of inter vivos transfers. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of a unit measure of dynasties that live for a
countable infinity of periods, t = 0, 1, ..., where each agent within a dynasty is active for two
periods. In the first period of their lives, agents are young adults and make consumption
11We thank the editor for suggesting the intergenerational disagreement interpretation.
7
saving decisions. In the second period, they become parents, decide how much to consume
and bequeath, and die. The next period their offspring become young adults and go through
the same life cycle. This is a model of non-overlapping generations.12 People have one
unit of time endowment that they supply inelastically to the market every period. Parents
bequeath because they are altruistic.
The economy begins with an initial parent in period 0. Every subsequent even period is a
parenthood (old adulthood) period, whereas every odd period is a young adulthood period.
Consider a parent in some calendar year t. Her preference over dynastic allocation is given
by
Vt = u(ct) + γ [u(ct+1) + δVt+2] ,
where δ,γ ∈ (0, 1), Vt represents the dynastic welfare of the parent in period t, ct is parental
consumption, and ct+1 is the first period consumption of the offspring. The instantaneous
utility function, u, has the usual properties: strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice
differentiable, with limc→0 u′(c) = +∞. The parameter δ represents the discount factor that
the parent thinks the offspring and all the future descendants should save according to dur-
ing their young adulthood period. The parameter γ is the altruism factor.
We model disagreement between parents and offspring in a way that minimally departs
from the standard dynastic framework: namely, the offspring agrees with the parent on
everything except for how to allocate his wealth between young and old adulthood. Specif-
ically, the offspring’s preference is given by
u(ct+1) + βδVt+2,
with β > 0. In this formulation, as long as β 6= 1, the discount rate that the offspring
uses between periods t + 1 and t + 2, βδ, is different from what is appropriate from his
parent’s perspective, δ. Parents are sophisticated in the sense that they fully anticipate this
discrepancy between their own and their offsprings’ preferences.
We do not make an assumption about whether β is smaller or larger than one from the
outset. However, both the Clarke, Preston, Raksin, and Bengtson (1999) study and anecdotal
evidence seem to suggest that it is more natural to consider the case in which β < 1. This is
12In Section 5.3, we allow for a longer life cycle and show that our main results regarding bequest taxation
are robust to such an extension. There, we also model periods in which parents and their offspring are alive
together and analyze inter vivos transfer behavior and taxation. We show that the results regarding bequest
taxation extend to inter vivos transfers.
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the case in which the offspring are impatient from the parents’ perspective. It is important
to note that Pareto inefficiency of laissez-faire equilibrium allocation does not depend on
whether the offspring are more or less patient than what the parents would like them to be.
We report how the sign of optimal transfer taxes depends on whether β is greater or less
than unity throughout the paper.
The benchmark model has an alternative interpretation. Under this interpretation, even
though the offspring’s true preference coincides with that of his parents, that is, he evaluates
his welfare according to u(ct+1) + δVt+2, the offspring faces self-control problems and saves
according to u(ct+1) + βδVt+2. This interpretation is in line with the literature on self-control
problems in the spirit of Laibson (1997). In the current paper, on the other hand, we assume
that the offspring and the parents truly disagree in the sense that u(ct+1) + βδVt+2 represents
not only the behavioral preference of the offspring but also his true preference.
Production takes place at the aggregate level according to the function F(kt, lt), where
kt and lt are aggregate levels of capital stock and labor in period t, and F is a neoclassical
concave production function with the usual properties: F1, F2 > 0 and F11, F22 ≤ 0. Since
each agent supplies one unit of labor inelastically, for all t, we have
lt = 1.
Letting θ be the depreciation rate, the total amount of resources available for consumption
and saving equals
f (k) = F(k, 1) + (1− θ)k.
Letting f (k0) be the endowment of the initial parent in period 0, the feasibility for any t ≥ 0
is
ct + kt+1 = f (kt).
As evident from the previous feasibility condition, we assume there is one representative
dynasty, which implies that in any calendar year, only one age group is alive. We could
instead allow for members of different dynasties to be at different points in their life cycles.
This would not change any of our results. Moreover, we could also allow for income hetero-
geneity by assuming, for instance, that people have different skill levels and that effective
labor is given by labor times the skill level, similar to Mirrlees (1971). In the main body of the
paper, we abstract from such “horizontal” distribution issues in order to isolate our mech-
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anism. We show in Section 5.2 that the mechanism behind our results is robust to income
heterogeneity.
3 Laissez Faire
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium parental transfer behavior. Let bt+1 and
bt+2 denote the level of bequests made by the parent in period t and the offspring’s saving
level in t + 1, respectively. Let Rt, wt be the interest rate and the wage rate in period t. Let
Q := {Rt, wt}∞t=0 be the sequence of prices that decision makers take as given. Finally, let
Qt := {Rs, ws}∞s=t be continuation of prices from period t onward.
Define V(at, Qt) as the value of the problem of an agent who is a parent in calendar year
t with at := Rtbt + wt units of wealth and who faces the price sequence Qt. The parent’s
problem is given by
V(at, Qt) = max
bt+1≥−B(Qt+1)
u(ct) + γ [u (ct+1(bt+1, Qt+1)) + δV (at+2(bt+1, Qt+1), Qt+2)] , (1)
subject to the budget constraints and the definition of wealth
ct = at − bt+1,
ct+1(bt+1, Qt+1) = Rt+1bt+1 + wt+1 − bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1),
at+2(bt+1, Qt+1) := Rt+2bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1) + wt+2,
together with the condition defining the policy of the offspring:13
bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1) = arg max
b˜t+2≥−B(Qt+2)
u
(
Rt+1bt+1 + wt+1 − b˜t+2
)
+ βδV(Rt+2b˜t+2 + wt+2, Qt+2). (2)
B(Qt) is the “natural” (and never binding) borrowing limit defined by requiring consump-
tion to be non-negative at all periods:
B(Qt) :=
∞
∑
s=t
ws
Πsp=tRs
.
In equilibrium, prices are given by
13To save notation, we indicate the policy as a function. In case there are multiple solutions to the offspring’s
problem, bt+2(·, Qt+1) should be intended as a selection from the policy correspondence.
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Rt = f ′(kt), (3)
wt = f (kt)− f ′(kt)kt,
and aggregate capital and saving levels satisfy the market clearing condition
kt = bt.
The parent chooses his bequest level bt+1 taking into account the choice rule of his off-
spring, bt+2(·, Qt+1), which describes how the offspring’s saving choice changes as a func-
tion of parental bequests under a given price sequence. The parent is sophisticated in the
sense that he correctly guesses his child’s choice, and that is why he takes (2) into account as
a constraint in his problem. Define bt+1(bt, Qt) as the policy function describing parental op-
timal bequeathing behavior as a function of his period t− 1 savings and the price sequence.
A Markov equilibrium consists of a sequence of capital levels {kt}∞t=0, a sequence of prices Q,
value functions V(·, Qt), and policy functions {bt+1(·, Qt), bt+2(·, Qt+1)}t=0,2,4,... such that: (i) the
value function and the policies are consistent with the parent’s and offspring’s problems (1) and (2);
(ii) the prices satisfy (3); (iii) markets clear: bt = kt for all t.
Proposition 1 below characterizes equilibrium parental transfer behavior. Proving Propo-
sition 1 would be relatively easier if we could assume the differentiability of policy function,
bt+2(·, Qt+1), in bequests received. However, the dynastic intertemporal resource alloca-
tion problem with disagreements across dynasty members implies that agents play dynamic
games, and it is well known (e.g., from the self-control literature) that in such environments,
we cannot guarantee even the continuity of the policy functions even when we focus our
attention on Markov equilibria.14 To ensure that Proposition 1 describes a general feature
of economies with intergenerational disagreements and is not an artifact of differentiability
assumptions, we prove it without making any differentiability or continuity assumptions
about the value or policy functions.
14See Morris and Postlewaite (1997) and Harris and Laibson (2002) for examples of economies with quasi-
hyperbolic discounters where policy functions are discontinuous. Krusell and Smith (2003) show that even
when we focus our attention on Markov equilibria, it is not possible to rule out the existence of discontinu-
ous equilibria. Notice that the discontinuity in these models arises from a “disagreement” across an agent’s
multiple selves, whereas in our model the disagreement is across different generations.
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Proposition 1. Suppose β < 1. Then, in equilibrium, in all parenthood periods t,
u′ (ct) ≥ Rt+1γu′ (ct+1) , (4)
with strict inequality whenever the offspring’s optimal saving policy, bt+2(·, Qt+1), is strictly mono-
tone in the amount of the bequests received, bt+1.
If β > 1, then
u′ (ct) ≤ Rt+1γu′ (ct+1) , (5)
with strict inequality whenever the offspring’s saving policy is strictly monotone in bt+1.
If β = 1, then
u′ (ct) = Rt+1γu′ (ct+1) . (6)
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.1.
We provide an intuition for Proposition 1 only for the β < 1 case; the intuition for the
β > 1 case is symmetric. To get a better grasp on what the proposition says, first focus on the
case in which the child and parent agree on intertemporal trade-offs, meaning β = 1. In that
case, the parent chooses the level of transfers to equate the marginal cost of his forgone con-
sumption (left-hand side of (6)) to the marginal benefit of his child’s increased consumption
in period t+ 1 (right-hand side of (6)). However, when β < 1, then, as seen from (4), the par-
ent keeps increasing transfers even after the marginal cost is equated to the marginal benefit
from increased child consumption in period t + 1. The parent does this because bequeath-
ing has an additional marginal benefit from the parent’s perspective when the offspring is
impatient. Intuitively, when β < 1, the offspring is undersaving from the parent’s perspec-
tive, meaning that ct+1 is higher than that is desired by the parent while ct+2 is lower. As
a result, in the eyes of the parent, a marginal unit saved by the offspring has a marginal
cost −u′(ct+1) that is lower than its marginal return δRt+2u′(ct+2). This implies that the
parental welfare goes up if the parent can make the offspring increase his savings, which
is possible by increasing bequests as long as the offspring’s optimal saving policy is strictly
increasing in the amount of bequests received. This is why increasing bequests carries an
additional benefit. We will provide a sharper characterization of equilibrium bequest be-
havior in Section 3.2, where we assume differentiability of the value and policy functions.
This characterization will also enable us to sharpen the intuition explained earlier. Before
that, we prove in Section 3.1 that laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficient for the general case
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without assuming differentiability.
3.1 The Inefficiency of Laissez-Faire Equilibrium
Proposition 2 below states and proves that as long as β 6= 1 the laissez-faire equilibrium
allocation is Pareto inefficient. The proof provides a resource-feasible perturbation of the
equilibrium allocation that improves the welfare of some agents strictly without hurting
others. We remark that the proof does not use any differentiability or continuity assumptions
regarding the equilibrium value or policy functions.
Proposition 2. Suppose β 6= 1. Then, the laissez-faire equilibrium allocation is Pareto inefficient.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.2.
The intuition for the inefficiency of equilibrium is as follows. As is evident from equation
(7) below, the parent’s welfare, Vt, depends on how much the offspring saves. In this sense,
there is a consumption externality. Obviously, this is true in the standard altruistic model
without disagreements as well (see Bernheim (1989)). In the standard case, however, since
the offspring fully agrees with the parent, the offspring internalizes the consequences of his
saving on the parent, so the externality does not have a consequence. This can be seen by
setting β = 1 in equation (7) :
Vt = u(ct) + γ
[
u(ct+1) + βδVt+2︸ ︷︷ ︸
offspring welfare
+(1− β)δVt+2
]
(7)
When β 6= 1, the offspring does not fully internalize the consequences of his saving on the
parent’s welfare. The level of savings he chooses affects the term (1− β)δVt+2 in (7), but
this term is external to the offspring. This externality is the reason why the equilibrium is
inefficient. In the case in which β < 1, the planner can improve both agents’ welfare by
forcing the offspring to increase his savings by a small amount. This creates a second-order
loss for the offspring, since he was already at his optimal allocation. It creates a first-order
gain for the parent, since the equilibrium level of the offspring’s saving is strictly suboptimal
from the parent’s perspective. Then, the planner simply transfers a suitable amount from the
parent to the offspring to compensate for the second-order decline in the offspring’s welfare,
achieving the desired Pareto improvement.
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It might be useful to relate the inefficiency result in our disagreement economy to what
is obtained in an economy with self-control problems. According to the self-control inter-
pretation, the offspring wants to save according to δ discounting but lacks self-control and
ends up saving according to βδ discounting. In this context, increasing the offspring’s sav-
ings by a small amount improves the welfare of both the offspring and the parent, implying
that the original equilibrium cannot be efficient. In presence of self-control problems, the
inefficiency arises because some agents cannot carry out actions that are optimal from ev-
erybody’s perspective. Instead, in our model with disagreement, βδ discounting represents
the offspring’s true preference, and thus, a perturbation that simply increases the offspring’s
saving rate cannot Pareto improve over equilibrium because it makes the offspring worse
off. As we explained above, the inefficiency of laissez-faire equilibria in our disagreement
economy comes from the existence of a consumption externality that arises from the presence
of disagreement.
3.2 Equilibrium Parental Behavior under Differentiability
In this section, we provide a marginal condition that characterizes equilibrium bequest be-
havior, assuming differentiability of the policy functions that describe the offspring’s sav-
ings. Recall that bt+2(·, Qt+1) represents the offspring’s equilibrium choice under price se-
quence Qt+1 as a function of the bequests he receives from his parent, bt+1. Now consider
a parent’s problem. The parent chooses bt+1 subject to the flow budget constraints and the
function bt+2(·, Qt+1), defined by (2), which describes the offspring’s saving decision. The
parent’s first-order optimality condition with respect to the bequest decision, bt+1, is
u′(ct) = γ
(
u′(ct+1)
[
Rt+1 − ∂bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1)
∂bt+1
]
+ δV1(at+2, Qt+2)Rt+2
∂bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1)
∂bt+1
)
,
(8)
where V1 refers to the derivative of the value function with respect to its first argument and
the derivatives are all evaluated at the equilibrium allocation.
The offspring’s first-order optimality condition for bt+2 is given by
u′(ct+1) = βδV1(at+2, Qt+2)Rt+2. (9)
Using (9) in the parental optimality condition (8), we get the following proposition, which
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describes equilibrium parental bequeathing behavior under differentiability.
Proposition 3. Suppose bt+2(·, Qt+1) is differentiable in bt+1. Then, in any parenthood period t,
the equilibrium bequest behavior is characterized by
u′(ct) = γ
(
Rt+1u′(ct+1) +
∂bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1)
∂bt+1
u′(ct+1)
[
−1+ 1
β
])
. (10)
Equation (10) is the usual savings optimality condition, with an additional term on the
right-hand side. The left-hand side is the marginal cost of increasing bequests, which equals
the utility loss from forgone parental consumption. The first term on the right-hand side is
the usual marginal benefit of increasing saving – the utility gain from increased consump-
tion in the period during which returns to savings are received. There is a second term on
the right-hand side, however. One can see that this term does not show up in the solution
to the usual savings problem where β = 1, meaning when the saver and the person re-
ceiving savings agree on what the receiver will do with the savings (an implication of the
envelope condition). This additional term summarizes how increasing parental transfers
affects parental welfare by changing the offspring’s life-cycle consumption pattern. It is a
multiplication of two terms: the first term,
∂bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1)
∂bt+1
> 0,
tells how the offspring’s saving is affected by an increase in bequests. In general, this deriva-
tive is weakly positive since increasing transfers increases the period t + 1 wealth of the
offspring, which weakly increases his savings. As we prove in Lemma 12 in Appendix A.1,
under the assumption of differentiability of bt+2(·, Qt+1), this derivative is strictly positive.15
The second term,
u′(ct+1)
[
−1+ 1
β
]
,
represents the utility value to the parent of increasing bt+2 marginally and is positive (resp.
negative) whenever β < 1 (resp. β > 1). Intuitively, when β < 1, the parent knows that
from his perspective, the offspring is undersaving. More precisely, since the offspring’s
Euler equation implies that −u′(ct+1) + βδV1(at+2, Qt+2)Rt+2 = 0 (see equation (9)), the
15To be precise, Lemma 12 proves that as long as the value function is differentiable, the policy is strictly
monotone. The differentiability of the value function is implied by the differentiability of the policy function
by the implicit function theorem.
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net return of a marginal unit of savings in the eyes of the parent is positive: −u′(ct+1) +
δV1(at+2, Qt+2)Rt+2 > 0. Thus, parental welfare goes up if the parent can make the offspring
increase his savings, which is possible by increasing bequests, since ∂bt+2(bt+1,Qt+1)∂bt+1 > 0. As
a result, the additional term in (10) is positive: there is an additional marginal benefit of
increasing transfers for the parent. It is this extra benefit of bequeathing that makes the
parent behave according to (4). Observe that under differentiability the strict version of
equation (4) holds.
4 Ramsey
In Proposition 2, we show that the laissez-faire equilibrium is unambiguously Pareto in-
efficient. The policy implications of this result might obviously depend on the particular
Pareto-efficient allocation that the policy targets. In this section, we start our optimal be-
quest tax policy analysis by targeting a widely adopted benchmark Pareto-efficient alloca-
tion, namely the “Ramsey” allocation. The Ramsey allocation is the efficient allocation that
puts all the weight on the initial generation parent. It is given by the solution to a fictitious
social planner’s consumption-saving problem where the planner discounts exponentially
at rate δ between young and old adulthood periods and discounts future generations by
altruism factor γ.
The Ramsey allocation has at least three desirable properties. First, it coincides with the
equilibrium allocation in the absence of conflict about intertemporal trade-offs. Thus, in the
absence of disagreements, the optimal Ramsey policy is simply not to distort bequests at all.
In this sense, in the case of the Ramsey allocation, the optimality of bequest tax under dis-
agreements is coming purely from the existence of disagreements. Second, it is unique and
simple to characterize as it is the dynastic solution to the standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans
optimal growth problem. Finally, the saving behavior prescribed in the Ramsey allocation -
saving according to discount factor δ - is optimal from the perpective of all the agents in the
dynasty except for the young adult making the saving decision.16
We first characterize the Ramsey allocation. Then, we show that there is a discrepancy
between the optimality conditions that characterize the equilibrium and the Ramsey bequest
16Evaluating welfare from the perspective of the initial self is also the route taken in much of the related
literature on self-control problems. See DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), Gruber and Koszegi (2004), and
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006), for example.
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behavior, and characterize this wedge. Finally, we provide an implementation of the Ramsey
allocation in the market through linear taxes on savings and bequests for a special class of
equilibria. When β < 1, the optimal tax on bequests is positive.
In Section 5.1, we generalize our results to all the allocations on the Pareto frontier. There,
we show that the optimal bequest wedge has a nice separable form between an efficiency
component and an intergenerational redistribution component. The principle that governs
the efficiency component of the wedge at any point on the Pareto frontier is identical to the
one that determines the “Ramsey” bequest wedge that we study in the present section.
4.1 The Ramsey Allocation
The Ramsey allocation is given by the solution to a fictitious social planner’s consumption-
saving problem where the planner has altruism and discount factors γ and δ, respectively.
The following Euler equations characterize the Ramsey levels of bequests and savings, which
we denote with an asterisk. For all t even, we have:
u′(c∗t ) = γ f ′(k∗t+1)u
′(c∗t+1), (11)
u′(c∗t+1) = δ f
′(k∗t+2)u′(c∗t+2). (12)
4.2 The Ramsey Wedge
Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium allocation does not satisfy the Ramsey condition
of optimality for bequests. Condition (11) indicates that the Ramsey allocation equates par-
ent’s marginal rate of substitution of consumption u
′(c∗t )
γu′(c∗t+1)
with the marginal rate of trans-
formation f ′(k∗t+1). On the other hand, the laissez-faire condition, (4), together with Ramsey
pricing Rt+1 = f ′(kt+1), implies a discrepancy between parent’s marginal rate of substitu-
tion and f ′(kt+1). This discrepancy evaluated at the Ramsey levels of consumption and
bequest, c∗t , c∗t+1 and k
∗
t+1, defines a positive bequest wedge. As we have discussed in Section
3, when β < 1 and whenever the offsprings’ policy is strictly monotone, bequeathing has
an additional benefit to the parents in the laissez-faire equilibrium since their offspring are
saving too little to begin with. This additional benefit creates a discrepancy between the
private and the social return to bequests, which is responsible for the bequest wedge.
If we assume differentiability of policy functions, we can provide the following expres-
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sion for the Ramsey bequest wedge:
BW∗t+1 := 1−
 u′(c∗t )
γu′(c∗t+1) f ′(k
∗
t+1)
− ∂bt+2(k
∗
t+1, Q
∗
t+1)
∂bt+1
[
−1+ 1β
]
f ′(k∗t+1)
 , (13)
where Q∗t+1 corresponds to the price sequence implied by the Ramsey allocation, that is,
Q∗t+1 := {R∗t+s, w∗t+s}∞s=1 = { f ′(k∗t+s), f (k∗t+s) − f ′(k∗t+s)k∗t+s}∞s=0, and bt+2(·, Q∗t+1) is the
equilibrium policy function of the offspring under Q∗t+1.
Next, we show that, when the policy of the offspring is differentiable, the bequest wedge
is strictly positive, since, in this case, the offspring’s saving is strictly increasing in the
amount of bequests received.
Corollary 4. Suppose bt+2(·, Q∗t+1) is differentiable in bt+1 and β < 1. Then, for any parenthood
period t, BW∗t+1 > 0.
Proof. Using equation (11) in the definition of BW∗t+1, we get
BW∗t+1 =
∂bt+2(k∗t+1, Q
∗
t+1)
∂bt+1
[
−1+ 1β
]
f ′(k∗t+1)
. (14)
Lemma 12 in Appendix A.1 shows that when bt+2(·, Q∗t+1) is differentiable in bt+1, then
∂bt+2(k∗t+1,Q∗t+1)
∂bt+1
> 0. BW∗t+1 > 0 then follows from 0 < β < 1.
4.3 Implementation: Ramsey Taxation of Bequests
In this section, we want to implement the Ramsey allocation through a linear tax system
on life-cycle savings and parental wealth transfers. Let τt+1 denote the linear tax rate on
returns to period t savings, bt+1. If t is a period of parenthood, then τt+1 is a tax on bequests.
Tax proceeds are rebated in a lump-sum manner in every period, so that the government
balances its budget period by period. Letting Tt denote lump-sum taxes in period t,
Tt = Rtτtbt.
Let Υ := {τt, Tt}∞t=0 be the sequence of taxes that the government chooses and commits to
at the beginning of time and Υt := {τs, Ts}∞s=t. Observe that any sequence of taxes, Υ, is by
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construction budget-feasible for the government. Let Υ∗ := {τ∗t , T∗t }∞t=0 denote a tax system
that implements the Ramsey allocation. We are interested in the Ramsey taxes on wealth
transfers. For expositional simplicity, we restrict attention to taxes that satisfy τt < 1 for all
t. This constraint will never be binding at the optimal solution Υ∗.
Letting Ψ := (Q,Υ) be the joint sequence of prices and taxes, let Ψt := (Qt,Υt). Define
Vt(at,Ψt) as the problem of a parent with wealth level at in calendar year t facing Ψt, where
the wealth level is at := Rtbt(1− τt) + Tt + wt. The parent’s problem is given by
V(at,Ψt) = max
bt+1≥−B(Ψt+1)
u (ct) + γ [u (ct+1(bt+1,Ψt+1)) + δV (at+2(bt+1,Ψt+1),Ψt+2)] ,
subject to the budget constraints
ct = at − bt+1,
ct+1(bt+1,Ψt+1) = Rt+1bt+1(1− τt+1) + Tt+1 + wt+1 − bt+2(bt+1,Ψt+1),
at+2(bt+1,Ψt+1) = Rt+2bt+2(bt+1,Ψt+1)(1− τt+2) + Tt+2 + wt+2,
and the offspring’s policy function is defined as
bt+2(bt+1,Ψt+1) = arg max
b˜t+2≥−B(Ψt+2),
u(c˜t+1) + βδV(a˜t+2,Ψt+2),
subject to
c˜t+1 = Rt+1bt+1(1− τt+1) + Tt+1 + wt+1 − b˜t+2,
a˜t+2 = Rt+2b˜t+2(1− τt+2) + Tt+2 + wt+2.
The natural debt limit under Ψt is given by
B(Ψt) :=
∞
∑
s=t
ws + Ts
Πsp=tRs(1− τs)
.
Notice that the offspring’s optimal policy is also a function of taxes. In general, since each
parent faces a constraint describing the offspring’s policy, which may potentially violate the
convexity of the constraint set, the parent’s problem may not be concave. Therefore, show-
ing that the first-order optimality conditions of agents are satisfied by the Ramsey allocation
under a tax system does not guarantee that the tax system implements the Ramsey alloca-
tion. As a result, Proposition 1 does not automatically imply that there is a linear tax system
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that implements the Ramsey allocation. For this reason, we restrict attention to Markov
equilibria with policy functions that are linear in current wealth. The linearity of the policy
functions guarantees that agents’ constraint sets are convex, thus implying that their prob-
lems are concave. Hence, we have the following implementation result.
Proposition 5. Let Υ∗ be a tax system under which there exists a Markov equilibrium with policies
that are linear in current wealth. Let Ψ∗ be the implied joint sequence of prices and taxes and
Mt+2(Ψ∗t+1) =
∂bt+2
(
b∗t+1,Ψ
∗
t+1
)
∂bt+1
be the coefficient of the offspring’s (linear) policy function under Ψ∗. If Υ∗ satisfies for all t ≥ 0 even
τ∗t+1 =
[
−1+ 1
β
]
Mt+2(Ψ∗t+1)
1
R∗t+1
and τ∗t+2 = 1−
1
β
, (15)
then Υ∗ implements the Ramsey allocation. In this system, policies are strictly increasing, and opti-
mal bequest taxes, τ∗t+1, are strictly positive if and only if β < 1.
Proof. The linearity of the policy functions implies that each agent’s problem is concave,
which implies that, once feasibility is guaranteed, the parent’s first-order optimality con-
ditions are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium. It is easy to derive the optimality
condition for parental bequest choice under taxes, analogous to (10):
u′(ct) = γu′(ct+1)
(
Rt+1 (1− τt+1) + ∂bt+2 (bt+1,Ψt+1)
∂bt+1
[
−1+ 1
β
])
.
Substituting in the Ramsey allocation and using (11), we obtain the expression for the opti-
mal bequest tax that is given by the first equality in (15). We now show that Mt+2(Ψ∗t+1) > 0.
Recall that the wealth of the offspring is given by at+1 = Rt+1bt+1(1− τt+1) + Tt+1 + wt+1.
This implies that ∂bt+2(bt+1,Ψt+1)∂bt+1 ≡
∂bt+2(bt+1,Ψt+1)
∂at+1
(1− τt+1)Rt+1. From the differentiability of
the offspring’s policy function, Lemma 12 in Appendix A.1 implies that the derivative of
offspring’s policy with respect to his wealth ∂bt+2(bt+1,Ψt+1)∂at+1 is strictly positive. In turn, this
implies that
∂bt+2(b∗t+1,Ψ∗t+1)
∂bt+1
= Mt+2(Ψ∗t+1) is strictly positive as long as τ
∗
t+1 < 1. We con-
clude the proof by showing that τ∗t+1 cannot be larger than one. Suppose τ
∗
t+1 ≥ 1. Then,
again from Lemma 12 and the definition of offspring’s wealth, it is immediate to see that
Mt+2(Ψ∗t+1) ≤ 0. The first equality in (15) together with Mt+2(Ψ∗t+1) ≤ 0, however, implies
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τ∗t+1 ≤ 0. We hence obtain a contradiction implying τ∗t+1 < 1.
Obviously, β = 1 implies τ∗t+1 = 0. If β > 1, the same line of proof shows τ
∗
t+1 > 0.
Next, we show that when the utility function is of the CEIS form, there is always a
Markov equilibrium with policy functions that are linear in current wealth.17
Proposition 6. Suppose period utility is of the CEIS form, meaning
u(c) =
c1−ρ
1− ρ , for ρ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ > 1;
= log(c), for ρ = 1.
Then, if an equilibrium with taxes exists, there is an equilibrium in which consumption in each period
is a linear function of the net present value of wealth as of that period.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.3.
It is interesting to note that even though the government corrects offsprings’ saving
behavior through saving subsidies, parental transfers should still be taxed to achieve the
Ramsey allocation. This occurs because, from the parent’s perspective, the offspring is still
undersaving. The subsidies that are paid to the offspring create a diversion between the
parent’s and the planner’s perception of what is optimal for the offspring. The govern-
ment sets the lump-sum taxes to balance its budget in period t + 2, meaning that it sets
Tt+2 = Rt+2τt+2bt+2. Thus, from the government’s perspective, the return to the offspring’s
savings in period t + 1 is actually Rt+2, and the taxes are there only to drive the offspring to
Ramsey behavior. The parent, on the other hand, takes lump-sum taxes as given and, hence,
sees the return as Rt+2(1 − τt+2) and wants the child to save optimally according to this
return. This is why the offspring, who save at the Ramsey level under the optimal saving
subsidy, are still undersaving from the parents’ perspective. As a result, parents still have a
motive to transfer more than the Ramsey level. To discourage this, the government finds it
optimal to tax bequests. Another way of interpreting this result is as follows. By bequeath-
ing an extra unit to the offspring, parents increase offsprings’ savings, which increases the
cost of financing the subsidy for the government. In this sense, bequests generate a negative
17For a special case of our model economy with partial equilibrium and constant prices, Phelps and Pollak
(1968) and Laibson (1994) have shown the existence of linear equilibria under CEIS utility.
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“fiscal externality”. The tax on bequests can be seen as a Pigouvian tax internalizing this
externality.
If the government (or the parents) could command the offspring to the Ramsey alloca-
tion, then there would be no need to distort parents’ bequest decision. A natural question
that follows, then, is whether the bequest tax result is peculiar to the assumption that the
government is restricted to using linear taxes to discipline offsprings’ savings. The proof of
Proposition 1 shows that as long as the offspring react to an increase in bequests by increas-
ing their savings, parents do have an extra return to bequeathing. Therefore, as long as the
government uses a tax policy that leaves offsprings’ equilibrium savings strictly increasing
in the bequests they receive, parents will bequeath too much if they are not taxed. We con-
clude that the optimality of the bequest tax is not peculiar to the implementation in which
there are linear taxes on children’s savings; bequest taxes would remain optimal for any tax
system that does not completely eliminate the monotonicity of offsprings’ optimal saving
policies in the amount of bequests they receive.
Finally, note that, implicit in the Markovianity assumption, we do not allow for con-
ditional bequests. In particular, parents are not allowed to condition the payment of the
bequest to a specific level of savings by the offspring. The lack of such - potentially welfare-
improving - arrangements might be justified by the fact that they are difficult to enforce in
reality. Recall, indeed, that bequest payments - by definition - occur after parents die and
saving decisions might be difficult to monitor, especially by third parties.18 In this sense, the
“Rotten Kid Theorem” of Becker (1974) does not hold in our environment by assumption.
4.4 A Back-of-the-Envelope Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we aim to give a rough idea of the quantitative importance of our mechanism
for bequest taxation. To do so, we compute optimal bequest taxes that implement the Ram-
sey allocation for a parameterized version of our economy. We focus on logarithmic utility
which allows us to find closed-form solutions for optimal bequest taxes when we focus on
Markov equilibria with linear policies.
18This is not to say that there are no instruments through which parents can make conditional transfers. For
instance, incentive trusts, which are trusts designed to encourage or discourage certain children behavior, exist
in the United States. In a typical incentive trust, the beneficiary receives a certain amount of money from the
trust only upon fulfilling a specific requirement such as graduating from college.
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Proposition 7. Suppose u(c) = log(c). Then, the optimal tax on the bequest received by offspring
in any period t + 1 is given by
τ∗t+1 =
δ(1+ γ)(1− β)
1+ δ
.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.4.
Observe that, under the logarithmic utility function assumption, the tax formula does
not depend on the shape of the production function, F, or the depreciation rate, θ. Therefore,
we do not need to specify values for these parameters. The only parameter values that are
needed to calculate optimal taxes are the discount factor, δ, the altruism factor, γ, and the
parameter, β, that represents the degree of disagreement. We assume perfect altruism in
the sense that parents discount offsprings’ consumption as much as they discount their own
consumption, (i.e., γ = δ). In this case, we have τ∗t+1 = δ(1− β). In quantitative work, it is
common to calibrate the discount factor using the annual real interest rate as a target. Under
the assumption that the interest rate is constant at R and equilibrium allocation is stationary
in the sense that consumption across young adulthood periods and parenthood periods are
constant over time, one can show that β, δ, and R have to jointly satisfy
δ2β
1− δ+ βδR
2 = 1.19 (16)
We take the annual real interest rate to be 3% and assume that each period in our model
corresponds to 25 years, implying R = 1.0325. Table 1 reports the calibrated values of δ in
the second row and the corresponding optimal bequest tax rates in the third row for different
values of β specified in the first row. A glance at Table 1 seems to reveal that the optimal
taxes generated by our mechanism have the potential of being quantitatively significant.
19Using the usual envelope condition, offsprings’ equilibrium optimality condition for saving (9) becomes
u′(ct+1) = Rβδu′(ct+2). This condition, together with the parental optimality condition (10) evaluated at γ = δ
and the steady-state requirement that ct = ct+2, implies that
δ2βR2
(
1+
∂bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1)
∂bt+1
−1+ 1/β
R
)
= 1.
It follows from equation (45) in the proof of Proposition 7 in Appendix A.4 that, under γ = δ, ∂bt+2(bt+1,Qt+1)∂bt+1 =
R δβ1−δ+δβ . Together these imply condition (16).
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Table 1: Optimal Bequest Taxes
β 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.95
Calibrated δ 0.571 0.545 0.524 0.506 0.491 0.484
Bequest tax 28.55% 21.80% 15.72% 10.12% 4.91% 2.42%
5 Extensions
In this section, we consider several extensions of the baseline framework. First and foremost,
we show that the optimality of creating a positive bequest wedge shown in Section 4 for
the case of Ramsey allocation holds for other allocations on the Pareto frontier. Second,
we extend our model by introducing horizontal inequality and show that bequest taxation
is still optimal. Moreover, we show that optimal bequest taxes are typically progressive.
Finally, we show that our normative results are also robust to extending people’s life cycle
to any finite periods and allowing parents and offspring to coexist in the same period. This
also allows us to show that it is optimal to tax inter vivos transfers as well. The optimality
of transfer taxation in the presence of illiquid bequests is also discussed.
5.1 Intergenerational Redistribution: Pareto-Efficient Bequest Wedges
The Ramsey allocation is one of the many possible Pareto-efficient allocations. Specifically,
it is the efficient allocation that arises when the planner only cares about the initial parent
directly. In this section, we study the whole Pareto frontier by allowing the planner to care
about all generations directly, and we characterize Pareto-efficient bequest wedges.
We begin by characterizing the Pareto frontier of the economy. Let U = {Un}∞n=1 be any
given sequence of utilities where Un ∈ R represents the minimum level of utility that needs
to be delivered to nth generation agents (who are born in calendar time 2n− 1), starting with
the agent born in period 1. Let U be the set of such utility sequences that are achievable by
feasible allocations.20
20A key feature restricting the set U is the domain of u : R+ → R. If u(0) > −∞, to be achievable, a sequence
of utilities U must admit a sequence of capital levels {kt}∞t=0 such that, for all t, we have 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f (kt) and
for generation n who are born in period s = 2n− 1
Un = u ( f (ks)− ks+1) + βδ
{
u ( f (ks+1)− ks+2) +
∞
∑
t=s+1
γt−sδt−s−1
[
u ( f (k2t−1)− k2t) + δu ( f (k2t)− k2t+1)
]}
.
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We compute a Pareto-efficient allocation by solving a planning problem where we max-
imize the utility of one agent, initial parent, subject to delivering each other generation the
utility promised to them by U. By changing U in the set of all feasible utility sequences U ,
the solution to this planning problem traces the whole Pareto frontier of the economy.
We use a simple recursive formulation of the planning problem to characterize the Pareto
frontier of the economy. If k is the level of capital at the beginning of the parenthood period
in a given generation, W : K×U → R, is the value function that denotes the maximal utility
for current parents that can be achieved subject to providing future generations a sequence
U of utilities.21 The value function is given by the solution to the following problem:
W(k, U) = max
y,k′
u( f (k)− y) + γ[u( f (y)− k′) + δW(k′, U′)]
s.t. 0 ≤ y ≤ f (k), 0 ≤ k′ ≤ f (y), U′ = C(U);
u( f (y)− k′) + βδW(k′, U′) ≥ U. (17)
The notation U′ = C(U) indicates the continuation sequence of U. The choice variables y
and k′ represent, respectively, the bequest decision of the parent and the saving decision of
the offspring. Constraint (17) guarantees that each new generation gets a level of utility U,
where U refers to the first term of U.
Since the problem is concave in the choice variables for each (k, U), it can be shown that
the value function W is concave in k for each U. Since u is differentiable, an application of
the Benveniste and Scheinkman lemma implies that W is differentiable in the first argument
for all U ∈ U .22 Formally, let g : K×U → R+ and h : K×U → R+ represent the policy func-
tions regarding bequest and life-cycle saving decisions, respectively. The envelope theorem
implies that
W1(k, U) = f ′(k)u′( f (k)− g(k, U)),
whenever 0 < g(k, U) < f (k), where W1 refers to the derivative of W with respect to the
first argument.
Concave problems admit Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. If we denote the multiplier associ-
ated with constraint (17) by λ, the first-order conditions for optimality of bequest and sav-
21K ≡ [0, k¯] is the domain of the level of capital stock. It is well known that, with a positive rate of deprecia-
tion and Inada on f at infinity, there is a k¯ such that f (k) < k ∀k ≥ k¯.
22See Stokey, Lucas, Jr., and Prescott (1989), Theorem 4.10.
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ings decisions respectively are
u′( f (k)− y) = (γ+ λ) f ′(y)u′( f (y)− k′), (18)
u′( f (y)− k′) = δγ+ λβ
γ+ λ
f ′(k′)u′( f (k′)− y′). (19)
Once we solve for the policy functions g and h, we can construct the Pareto-efficient se-
quence of capital levels in the usual way. Let k∗0 be the initial level of capital and U =
{Un}∞n=1 be the sequence of utilities guaranteed to the offspring determining a particular
point on the Pareto frontier, with continuations Um = C
(
C
(
. . . (U)
))
= {Un}∞n=m, m ≥ 1.
The sequence of capital levels associated with this particular efficient allocation can be re-
covered recursively: k∗1 = g(k0, U1), k
∗
2 = h(k
∗
1, U1), k
∗
3 = g(k
∗
2, U2), k
∗
4 = h(k
∗
3, U2), and so
on. The capital sequence {k∗t }∞t=0, together with (18), allows us to recover the sequence of
multipliers as follows. If t is an even period, then we have
u′( f (k∗t )− k∗t+1) = (γ+ λ∗t+1) f ′(k∗t+1)u′( f (k∗t+1)− k∗t+2), (20)
where λ∗t+1 ≥ 0 represents the multiplier on the utility promise constraint, (17), for agent
born in period t + 1. This will be the multiplier associated with constraint (17) in the recur-
sive problem, for k = k∗t (t even), and U = U t2+1, where the latter is the relevant continuation
of utility sequence from U.
We generalize the expression of the Ramsey bequest wedge given by (13) for a Pareto-
efficient allocation indexed by U:23
BW∗t+1(U) := 1−
 u′(c∗t )
γu′(c∗t+1) f ′(k
∗
t+1)
− ∂bt+2(k
∗
t+1, Q
∗
t+1)
∂bt+1
[
−1+ 1β
]
f ′(k∗t+1)
 ,
where Q∗t+1 is the price sequence generated from the Pareto-efficient allocation as before and
∂bt+2(k∗t+1,Q∗t+1)
∂bt+1
represents the derivative of period t + 1 offsprings’ policy with respect to the
bequests received at k∗t+1 and Q
∗
t+1. Using (20) in the previous definition of BW
∗
t+1(U) gives
BW∗t+1(U) = −
λ∗t+1
γ
+
∂bt+2(k∗t+1, Q
∗
t+1)
∂bt+1
[
−1+ 1β
]
f ′(k∗t+1)
. (21)
23For notational simplicity, we do not indicate the dependence of the wedge on the level of initial capital
stock k0.
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The bequest wedge characterized by (21) has two components. Consider the second term
on the right-hand side of (21). This term represents the efficiency component of the bequest
wedge that arises from intergenerational disagreements. A comparison of this component
with the Ramsey bequest wedge (14) shows that the two expressions are essentially identical.
The efficiency component is positive, meaning that it calls for a tax on bequests, as long as
the offspring is impatient from the parent’s perspective (β < 1). The intuition is the same as
in the Ramsey case. In particular, observe that the sole reason for the efficiency component is
the presence of disagreement: the wedge disappears when there is no disagreement (β = 1).
In the Ramsey case, the efficiency wedge is the only component of the wedge. In gen-
eral, the Pareto-efficient bequest wedge has another component, though. The first term on
the right-hand side of (21) represents this component, which comes from intergenerational
redistribution. The intergenerational redistribution wedge is also present in the standard al-
truistic model of bequests without disagreements.24 It is indeed easy to see from (21) that
this component exists even when β = 1. The intergenerational redistribution wedge is neg-
ative and thus calls for a subsidy on bequests. It is strictly negative as long as the multiplier,
λ∗t+1, is strictly positive. This is true as long as the constraint (17) binds, which is equiv-
alent to the planner putting a direct welfare weight on the offspring born in period t + 1.
Intuitively, the offspring’s welfare enters the planner’s objective through two channels: one
indirectly through the parent’s welfare and the other directly. Thus, the planner cares about
the offspring more than the parent does, and for this reason the parent bequeaths too little
from the planner’s perspective. It is then optimal to subsidize parents. The magnitude of
the intergenerational redistribution wedge depends on the Pareto-efficient allocation itself.
In the formula in (21), this dependence is implicit as λ∗t+1 depends on the sequence of utility
promises, U, which indexes Pareto-efficient allocations. Of course, even though the laissez-
faire equilibrium allocation is never efficient, it might be the case that optimal bequest taxes
are zero. This would happen if the intergenerational disagreement and intergenerational
redistribution components of the tax formula exactly offset each other.
Ramsey allocation as Pareto Improvement: An example with Logarithmic utility. The
Ramsey allocation and the taxes that achieve this allocation may improve the welfare of all
agents in the economy relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium allocation. In this section, we
focus on an example in which the instantaneous utility function is logarithmic and produc-
24See Kaplow (1995), Kaplow (2001), and Farhi and Werning (2010).
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tion in period t is given by f (kt) = Rkt +w, where R > 0 and w ≥ 0 are given parameters of
the production function. In Proposition 14 in Appendix A.4, we derive an analytic condition
regarding when the Ramsey allocation Pareto improves over the laissez-faire equilibrium
allocation that depends only on γ, δ, and β. Using this condition, and focusing for simplicity
on the case in which people are perfectly altruistic (γ = δ), the following proposition shows
that for any level of disagreement between parents and offspring that satisfies β ∈ (0, 1), the
Ramsey allocation dominates the equilibrium allocation as the discount factor approaches
1.25
Proposition 8. Suppose u(c) = log(c) and f (k) = Rk + w, with R > 0 and w ≥ 0. Suppose
further that γ = δ. Then, for any β ∈ (0, 1), the Ramsey allocation Pareto improves over laissez-
faire allocation (with linear policies) as δ→ 1.
Proof. Relegated to the end of Appendix A.4.
By definition, the Ramsey allocation makes the period 0 parent better off relative to the
laissez-faire equilibrium. Regarding an agent who belongs to any future generation, moving
from the laissez-faire equilibrium to the Ramsey allocation involves a trade-off. On the one
hand, such a move forces the agent to save according to discount factor δ for his old age,
and this hurts his welfare, since he saves according to βδ in equilibrium, which is his most
preferred saving level. On the other hand, the Ramsey allocation forces his descendants to
save according to δ as well. This creates a welfare improvement for the agent in considera-
tion, since in equilibrium the descendants save according to βδ whereas he prefers them to
save according to δ. As the discount factor δ goes to 1, the welfare improvement accumulates
over all descendants without being discounted. In this case, the future benefit dominates the
current cost and the Ramsey allocation increases the welfare of the agent in consideration.
As a result, the Ramsey allocation Pareto improves over the laissez-faire equilibrium.
This intuition applies to less extreme cases as well. Using Proposition 14 in Appendix
A.4, for each β, we can find a value of δ = γ above which the Ramsey allocation Pareto
dominates the equilibrium allocation. Table 2 reports threshold δ values that correspond
to several values of β. A comparison with the calibrated δ values in Table 1 shows that,
under the parametric assumptions made about the utility and production functions in this
25We focus on the case with β < 1 in order to have well-defined lifetime utilities for all δ ≤ 1. A direct
inspection of Proposition 14 in Appendix A.4 shows that for the case of γ 6= δ we obtain the same result when
both γ and δ are sufficiently close to 1.
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Table 2: Ramsey Allocation as Pareto Improvement
β 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.95
δ¯ 0.758 0.745 0.734 0.724 0.718 0.711
section, the Ramsey allocation is not likely to Pareto improve over the laissez-faire equilib-
rium allocation. Notice that, even when the Ramsey allocation does not constitute a Pareto
improvement, it might still be the case that there is a feasible allocation associated with a
positive tax on bequests that improves welfare for all generations over the laissez-faire.
5.2 Horizontal Redistribution
An important simplifying assumption we have made so far in the paper is that all dynasties
in the economy are identical. In this section, we relax this assumption and allow people to
differ in their skill levels, which translates into income inequality in equilibrium.
A key issue that arises when the population is divided among different income groups is
horizontal redistribution, that is, redistribution across different families. In this section, we
incorporate Mirrlees (1971)’s model of horizontal redistribution into our model of bequest
taxation and analyze how the normative predictions of the latter change under inequality
and redistribution. First, we show that in two important cases, all the normative results
derived in the model without heterogeneity continue to hold exactly. These two cases are:
(i) when horizontal redistribution can be performed via nondistortionary taxation, and (ii)
when we are interested in the Ramsey allocation, that is, in the notation of Section 5.1, when
λ = 0. Second, we show that, when the planner cares directly about the offspring’s welfare
(i.e., when λ > 0) and, in addition, skills are private information to the agents, horizontal re-
distribution introduces an element of progressivity into optimal bequest taxation. We show
that under certain conditions (e.g., logarithmic utility), the optimal bequest tax is progressive.
The progressivity of optimal bequest taxes can be interpretted to provide a justification for
bequest tax exemptions observed in actual tax systems which constitute a specific form of
progressivity.
To reduce the notational burden, we present our results using a three-period framework.
In order to analyze efficient bequest taxation in the presence of imperfect horizontal redis-
tribution, we follow the Mirrleesian tradition, assuming that people’s labor incomes are
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publicly observable whereas their productivities and labor supplies are not.
A Mirrleesian Model Consider an economy that lasts three periods. At t = 0, skill level
s ≥ 0 is drawn from a set S according to a distribution H and parents choose labor l0 ∈ [0, 1]
with flow utility
u(c0)− v (l0) ,
where the function v is increasing and convex, with v′(0) = 0 and v′(1) = ∞. To simplify the
analysis, we assume that in periods 1 and 2, labor is supplied inelastically at l¯t = 1, as in the
previous sections of the paper. Income in period t = 0 equals y0 = w0sl0, which is publicly
observable, as is the real wage per unit of skill w0. In periods t = 1, 2, all agents have a
common labor income yt, that is, the offspring do not inherit the skills of their parents. This
is an extreme form of mean reversion in skills, which allows us to analyze optimal bequest
taxation in an environment in which the bequest behavior is qualitatively in line with data
(richer parents leaving higher bequests).
Throughout this section, we assume that the planner is Utilitarian and cares about all
the dynasties equally. Given an allocation, define zt(s) := u(ct(s)) as the utility an agent
from family s in period t receives from consuming ct(s). Since u(·) is one-to-one, a planner
assigning a consumption allocation is the same as a planner assigning utility. We find it
convenient to write down the planning problem where the planner chooses utilities. Letting
λ be the direct welfare weight the planner puts on the offspring, the planner’s objective
function is
max
{zt(·)}2t=0,y0(·)
ˆ
S
{
z0(s)− v
(
y0(s)
w0s
)
+ (γ+ λ)z1(s) + δ(γ+ λβ)z2(s)
}
dH(s). (22)
For each t = 0, 1, 2, define
Ct :=
ˆ
S
ct(s)dH(s) =
ˆ
S
g(zt(s))dH(s), L0 :=
ˆ
S
l0(s)sdH(s), L1 = L2 = 1,
where the function g represents the inverse of the utility function u (i.e., g := u−1), and the
variables Ct and Lt represent the aggregate amounts of consumption and labor in efficiency
units in period t. Let Kt denote aggregate capital stock installed as of period t. As before,
factors of production are priced competitively, and in particular, wt := FL(Kt, Lt), where FL
refers to the partial derivative of F with respect to labor. Aggregate feasibility is then given
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by, for each t = 0, 1, 2,
Ct + Kt+1 ≤ F(Kt, Lt) + (1− θ)Kt, with K0 given. (23)
We assume that the skill level, s, is privately observed by the parent. This implies that
the planner also faces a set of incentive constraints in period 0, namely, for all s, sˆ ∈ S:
z0(s)− v
(
y0(s)
sw0
)
+ γ [z1(s) + δz2(s)] ≥ z0(sˆ)− v
(
y0(sˆ)
sw0
)
+ γ [z1(sˆ) + δz2(sˆ)] . (24)
Notice that since all information about skill types is revealed once and for all in period 0,
there are only period 0 incentive constraints.
Given λ, the planner’s problem then is to maximize (22) subject to (23) and (24). As
explained in Section 5.1, by varying λ ∈ [0,∞), one can trace the Pareto frontier of the
economy across generations.
For any λ ≥ 0, we characterize the corresponding Pareto-efficient allocation by consid-
ering a perturbation of it as follows: for a given s, set zε0(s) = z
∗
0(s)− γε, zε1(s) = z∗1(s) + ε,
and zε2(s) = z
∗
2(s). Notice that since
zε0(s) + γ [z
ε
1(s) + δz
ε
2(s)] = z
∗
0(s) + γ [z
∗
1(s) + δz
∗
2(s)] ,
all such perturbations are by construction incentive compatible. This implies that for this
set of perturbations, one can disregard the incentive constraints while solving the planner’s
problem. Let µt denote the multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint in period
t. The efficient allocation has to solve the first-order optimality condition for the planner’s
problem over the choices of ε in a neighborhood of zero; that is, the following condition has
to hold:
λ+
µ0γ
u′(c∗0(s))
− µ0
u′(c∗1(s)) f ′(K
∗
1)
= 0,
where f ′(K∗1) := FK(K
∗
1 , 1) + (1− θ) is the return to capital in period 1. The previous condi-
tion can be rearranged as
λ
µ0γ
u′(c∗0(s)) =
u′(c∗0(s))
γ f ′(K∗1)u′(c
∗
1(s))
− 1. (25)
Recall that the bequest wedge for a particular Pareto-efficient allocation is the correction
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that the planner needs to create in order to align the private and social marginal returns to
bequests. Analogously to the expression for the bequest wedge in (13), we define the bequest
wedge for a family of type s under Pareto index λ to be26
BW∗(λ, s) := 1−
 u′(c∗0(s))
γ f ′(K∗1)u′(c
∗
1(s))
− ∂b2(b
∗
1(s), Q
∗
1)
∂b1
[
−1+ 1β
]
f ′(K∗1)
 . (26)
Plugging (25) into (26) we get
BW∗(λ, s) = − λ
µ0γ
u′(c∗0(s)) +
∂b2(b∗1(s), Q
∗
1)
∂b1
[
−1+ 1β
]
f ′(K∗1)
. (27)
Similar to the bequest wedge characterized by (21) in Section 5.1, the bequest wedge
characterized by (27) has two components. The first component arises from intergenera-
tional redistribution and always implies a subsidy on bequests, whereas the second one is
the efficiency component that is there to correct the externality arising from intergenerational
disagreements, and it always implies a tax.
The intergenerational redistribution component, − λµ0γu′(c∗0(s)), is increasing in s (it is a
subsidy that decreases with parental income). Notice indeed that, since the effort cost func-
tion v is increasing and convex, incentive compatibility implies that c∗0(s) is increasing in
s. The mechanism behind the progressivity of the intergenerational redistribution compo-
nent is the same as in Farhi and Werning (2010). Intuitively, as long as λ > 0, the plan-
ner’s preference for c1 relative to c0 is stronger than that of the parents. This is easy to see
by comparing the planner’s objective function, (22), with incentive constraints, (24). This
means that the planner will find it more effective to generate redistribution by reducing in-
equality in c1 compared with reducing inequality in c0. In turn, this implies that the optimal
cross-sectional distribution of c1 is more compressed than that of c0. As a consequence, the
efficient allocation displays increasing consumption (between periods t = 0 and t = 1) for
agents with low s and decreasing consumption for agents with high s. Since all parents face
the same interest rate, R∗1 = f
′(K∗1), but must be content with different intertemporal pat-
terns of consumption, a natural implementation of the efficient allocation would prescribe
higher bequest taxes to rich parents (since otherwise they will have an incentive to deviate
26Using the taxation principle, the wedge can also be written as a function of parent’s income y0.
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from the recommended consumption plan by increasing bequests) and lower bequest taxes
to poor parents.
Even though the sign of the efficiency component of the bequest wedge in (27) is de-
terminate, whether it increases or decreases with s is not. This is because a Pareto-efficient
allocation does not specify a bequest distribution, {b∗1(s)}s∈S; it only specifies an aggregate
capital stock, K∗1 . Since, in general, the derivative of the offspring policy may depend on the
level of bequests received, the monotonicity properties of the efficiency wedge depend on
the specifics of the implementation and are indeterminate. Under the CEIS utility function,
however, offspring always save a constant fraction of the wealth transfers they receive from
their parents. This implies that the derivative of the offspring saving policy is a constant
that is independent of s, further implying that the efficiency component is flat. Thus, in this
latter case, depending on which component dominates, the bequest wedge implies either a
subsidy that is decreasing with s or a tax that is increasing with s.
In Proposition 15 in Appendix B, we provide a simple tax system that implements Pareto-
efficient allocations in a market economy where people trade a risk-free bond. We show that,
under the further restrictive assumption of logarithmic preferences, this tax system features
progressive bequest taxation in the sense that the marginal bequest tax increases with the
amount of bequests.
There are two important cases in which the bequest wedge in (27) simplifies to the be-
quest wedge expressions derived earlier. First, if skills are publicly observable, then since
u′(c∗0(s)) = µ0 for all s, (27) reduces to
BW∗(λ, s) = −λ
γ
+
∂b2(K∗1 , Q
∗
1)
∂b1
[
−1+ 1β
]
f ′(K∗1)
,
where we assume the planner chooses b∗1(s) = K
∗
1 in the efficient allocation. This expression
is identical to (21), which is the expression for the bequest wedge in Section 5.1 when there is
no heterogeneity. Under the CEIS assumption, an equilibrium with linear strategies exists,
and following the proof of Proposition 5, one can show that there is a corresponding flat
optimal tax or subsidy.
Second, if the planner only cares about the parent directly (λ = 0), then, even in the
presence of income heterogeneity and imperfect redistribution, the bequest wedge given by
(27) reduces to expression (14) in Section 4:
33
BW∗(0, s) =
∂b2(b∗1(s), Q
∗
1)
∂b1
[
−1+ 1β
]
f ′(K∗1)
> 0.
Since future generations are not weighted directly, the bequest wedge consists only of the
efficiency component and, hence, is unambiguously positive. Again under the CEIS as-
sumption, Proposition 5 implies that there is a linear equilibrium in which the derivative of
the offspring’s saving policy is a constant, implying that there is a corresponding flat optimal
bequest tax that implements this particular Pareto-efficient allocation.
5.3 Longer Life Cycle, Coexistence, and Inter Vivos Taxation
In our benchmark model, we assume that people live for two periods and parents and off-
spring do not coexist. In this section, we extend our model by allowing each agent within
a dynasty to be active for I + 1 periods: in the first I periods, agents make consumption-
saving decisions. In the last period of their lives, parents coexist with their offspring who
are already in the first period of young adulthood. Parents decide how much to consume
and transfer to their offspring. Transfers can be made in two ways: inter vivos transfers are
received by the offspring during the coexistence period, and bequests are received at the
beginning of the next period, after the parent dies. We show that the longer life cycle does
not alter the main result, that is, bequests should be taxed. Furthermore, thanks to the co-
existence period in the extended model, we are able to analyze parental inter vivos transfer
behavior and establish the optimality of taxing inter vivos transfers as well.
Consider any calendar year t in which there is a parent who is in the last period of his
life. His preference over dynastic allocation is given by
Vt = u(cot ) + γ
[
u(ct) + δu(ct+1) + ...+ δI−1u(ct+I−1) + δIVt+I
]
,
where Vt represents the dynastic welfare of the parent who is in the last period of his life in
period t and Vt+I represents that of the offspring in his terminal period, t + I. The term cot is
the last period consumption of the parent, and ct is the consumption level of the offspring
who is at age 1 in period t. Observe that cot and ct occur in the same period. To keep aggregate
labor supply constant across periods, we assume that only the offspring has one unit of time
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endowment in the period of coexistence. Clearly, this assumption is not material for any of
our results.
There are two natural ways to extend our baseline model to a multiperiod setup, and
both deliver qualitatively same normative predictions. First, one can envision agents as
standard exponential discounters, perhaps with varying discount factors over the life cycle,
so that the discount factor between their own consumption at age i and i + 1 is βiδ ≤ δ. In
this formulation, agents are time consistent. Second, we can assume that agents face self-
control problems and have time-inconsistent preferences. In this model, agents disagree
with their future selves over intertemporal trade-offs as well. That is, at any age i, people
discount the future with βiδ and want their future selves to discount with δ. To clarify that it
is the intergenerational disagreement that implies the optimality of transfer taxation and not
necessarily self-control problems, in the rest of the section, we focus on the time-consistent
extension.27
The offspring’s preference in period i of his life can be expressed recursively as
Vct+i−1 = u(ct+i−1) + βiδV
c
t+i for i = 1, . . . , I − 1, and
Vct+I−1 = u(ct+I−1) + β IδVt+I.
Observe that we allow for the disagreement parameter, β, to depend on i. When βi = 1 for
all i, there is no disagreement between generations about intertemporal trade-offs. When-
ever βi < 1 for some i, people at age i disagree with their parents. If we set βi = β for all i,
that would mean that the degree of intergenerational disagreement is constant over age. We
allow for a time-varying degree of disagreement in order to show that our transfer taxation
results do not depend on how the degree of intergenerational disagreement evolves over the
life cycle. We show that, as long as the parent and the offspring disagree on an intertempo-
ral trade-off either during the period the offspring receives transfers or in any subsequent
period (or both), it is optimal to distort parental transfer behaviour.
Let dt and bot+1 denote the inter vivos transfers and bequests made by the parent who is
in his last period of life in period t. Let bt+i denote the offspring’s age i saving level.
The parent, whose wealth level is at = Rtbt + wt, solves
27In an earlier working paper version, Pavoni and Yazici (2014), we focus on the time-inconsistent extension
where, in addition to intergenerational disagreement, people disagree with their future selves as well. We find
that our results survive this double degree of disagreement as well.
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V(at, Qt) = max
bot+1,dt
u(cot ) + γ
[
I−1
∑
i=0
δiu(ct+i) + δIV(at+I , Qt+I)
]
,
subject to the budget constraints28
cot = Rtbt − bot+1 − dt,
ct(dt, Qt) = dt + wt − bt+1(dt, Qt),
ct+1(dt, bot+1, Qt) = Rt+1bt+1(dt, Qt) + wt+1 + Rt+1b
o
t+1 − bt+2(dt, bot+1, Qt),
ct+i−1(dt, bot+1, Qt) = Rt+i−1bt+i−1(dt, b
o
t+1, Qt) + wt+i−1 − bt+i(dt, bot+1, Qt), for 3 ≤ i ≤ I,
at+I(dt, bot+1, Qt) = Rt+Ibt+I(dt, b
o
t+1, Qt),
and subject to the constraints defining the life-cycle saving policy functions of the offspring:
that is, [bt+1(dt, Qt), bt+2(dt, bot+1, Qt)..., bt+I(dt, b
o
t+1, Qt)] solves
29
max
{bˆt+i}Ii=1
u(ct) +
I−1
∑
i=1
β¯iδ
iu(ct+i) + β¯ IδIV(at+I , Qt+I),
where β¯i = ∏in=1 βn.
Notice that since each agent is time consistent, we can assume that the offspring choose
their lifetime savings once at the beginning of their life cycle. The vector of functions
[bt+1(dt, Qt), bt+2(dt, bot+1, Qt)..., bt+I(dt, b
o
t+1, Qt)] describes how offsprings’ savings choices
over the life cycle depend on the parental transfers they receive, (dt, bot+1), and prices, Qt.
Observe that offsprings’ saving at age 1 in year t, denoted by bt+1, only depends on the inter
vivos transfers they receive in that period but not on the level of bequests, bot+1, since we
assume that these people receive bequests only after their parents die, in year t + 1.
We now derive a marginal condition that characterizes equilibrium inter vivos behavior,
assuming differentiability of the policy functions that describe offspring saving behavior
at different ages. Consider a parent’s problem of choosing dt and bot+1 subject to the flow
budget constraints and the offspring’s policy functions. Let
∂bt+i(dt,bot+1,Qt)
∂dt
represent how an
increase in inter vivos transfers affects savings at age i calendar year t+ i− 1. For notational
28The real interest and wage rates are given by marginal products of capital and labor as in the benchmark
model. The only difference is for the period right after coexistence, total capital stock in the economy is equal
to the sum of the offsprings’ savings in the coexistence period and parental bequests kt+1 = bt+1 + bot+1.
29Again, the notation implicitly assumes that policies are single valued. The usual caveat applies: whenever
we have multiple solutions, the policies should be interpreted as selections from the policy correspondences.
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simplicity, we write this partial derivative as ∂bt+i∂dt whenever doing so does not create con-
fusion. The parent’s first-order optimality condition with respect to the inter vivos decision
is
u′(cot ) = γ
(
u′(ct)
[
1− ∂bt+1
∂dt
]
+
I−1
∑
i=1
δiu′(ct+i)
∂ct+i
∂dt
+ δIV1(at+I , Qt+I)Rt+I
∂bt+I
∂dt
)
, (28)
where
∂ct+i
∂dt
=
[
Rt+i
∂bt+i
∂dt
− ∂bt+i+1
∂dt
]
, (29)
and, clearly, the derivatives are evaluated at the equilibrium allocation and price sequence.
It follows from the time-consistent problem of the offspring that the following Euler
equations characterize his optimal saving decisions:
u′(ct+i) = βi+1δRt+i+1u′(ct+i+1), for i = 0, 1, ..., I − 2, and (30)
u′(ct+I−1) = β IδRt+IV1(at+I , Qt+I),
where, again, the derivatives are evaluated at the equilibrium allocation and price sequence.
Using (30) in the parental optimality condition for the inter vivos decision, (28), and the
fact that the only way dt affects decisions from t + 1 onward is through its effect on period t
decisions, meaning
∂bt+i
∂dt
=
∂bt+i
∂bt+1
∂bt+1
∂dt
,
we get the following proposition, which describes equilibrium parental inter vivos behavior
under differentiability of policy functions.
Proposition 9. Suppose the policy functions that describe offspring behavior over the life cycle are
differentiable. Then, equilibrium inter vivos transfers in any parenthood period t are characterized by
u′(cot ) = γ
(
u′(ct) + ∆t
)
, (31)
where
∆t :=
I−1
∑
i=0
δiu′(ct+i)
[
−1+ 1
βi+1
]
∂bt+i+1(dt, bot+1, Qt)
∂dt
. (32)
Condition (31) is analogous to (10), the optimality condition for bequests in the bench-
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mark model under differentiability. The left-hand side is the marginal cost of increasing
inter vivos transfers, which equals the utility loss from forgone parental consumption. The
first term on the right-hand side is the usual marginal benefit of increasing transfers. The
second term on the right-hand side, ∆t, summarizes the extra benefit from increasing trans-
fers that exists because of the presence of intergenerational disagreement. It is analogous to
the second term on the right-hand side of (10). The main difference is that, since the parent
and the offspring (potentially) disagree on savings at different ages, it is summed over all
ages of disagreement. Intuitively, the offspring is saving less than optimal from the parent’s
perspective at any age i where βi < 1. As a result, parental welfare increases if the parent
can make the offspring increase period i savings, which is possible by increasing inter vivos
transfers as long as ∂bt+i+1∂dt > 0.
To see the implication of Proposition 9 for Ramsey inter vivos taxation, first observe that
in the Ramsey allocation we have
u′ (co∗t ) = γu′ (c∗t ) . (33)
Comparing (31) with (33) leads to the Ramsey inter vivos wedge as
IW∗t ≡ 1−
(
u′(co∗t )
γu′(c∗t )
− ∆
∗
t
u′(c∗t )
)
,
where ∆∗t is ∆t evaluated at the Ramsey allocation. The Ramsey inter vivos wedge in period
t measures the distortion that the planner needs to create in the return to the inter vivos
transfer of a parent in period t in order to align private and social marginal returns to be-
quests.
Corollary 10. Suppose the policy functions that describe offspring behavior over the life cycle are
differentiable and βi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} with at least one inequality holding as strict. Then,
IW∗t > 0.
Proof. Under the assumption of differentiability of policy functions, ∂bt+1(d
∗
t ,b
o∗
t+1,Q
∗
t )
∂dt
> 0,
which follows from a simple extension of Lemma 12 in Appendix A.1. From (32), we get
∆∗t > 0 under the assumption that βi ≤ 1 for all i and βi < 1 for at least one i. Plugging (33)
in the definition of IW∗t , we find that IW∗t =
∆∗t
u′(c∗t )
> 0.
Corollary 10 is analogous to Corollary 4 for the case of bequests in Section 4.2. One can
further show that an analog to Proposition 5 also holds for the environment with multi-
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period life cycle and coexistence: under the assumption that equilibrium with linear taxes
features optimal policies that are linear in current wealth, there is a linear tax system that
implements the Ramsey allocation, and in this tax system, taxes on inter vivos transfers are
strictly positive.30
The argument for positive taxation of bequests in a multiperiod life-cycle environment
is identical to the argument for inter vivos taxation and is therefore omitted for the sake of
brevity. We just note that one can compute the optimal bequest wedge by plugging the first-
order optimality conditions of the offspring, (30), into the first-order optimality condition
describing the bequest behavior. The optimal bequest wedge, given by
BW∗t+1 =
∆∗t+1
δ f ′(k∗t+1)u′(c
∗
t+1)
,
where
∆∗t+1 =
I−1
∑
i=1
δiu′(c∗t+i)
[
−1+ 1
βi+1
]
∂bt+i+1(d∗t , bo∗t+1, Q
∗
t )
∂bot+1
,
is positive as long as βi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ {2, ..., I} with at least one inequality holding as strict.
For I = 2, the wedge reduces to (14).
5.4 Long-Term Assets and Liquidity Constraints
The front-loading of consumption by offspring relative to what their parents prefer lies at
the heart of our transfer taxation results. A natural question then is: if the parents have
access to assets with more than one-period maturities, can they force their offspring into the
consumption patterns they want by carefully choosing the portfolio of these assets?
First, observe that if the offspring do not face liquidity constraints, then the timing of
transfers cannot constrain their consumption patterns at all. In this case, the strategy of using
long-term assets is fruitless in disciplining offspring’s saving behavior, and we are back at
the benchmark environment without long-term assets.31 The real question, then, is what
happens if parents have access to long-term assets and children face liquidity constraints?
30One might argue that since inter vivos transfers are received while the parent is still alive, the parent might
have more leverage in affecting offspring saving behavior in that period. If the parent is able to ensure that the
offspring saves exactly according to parental preference, then they would not have a reason to do excessive
inter vivos transfers, and hence, there would be no need to tax inter vivos transfers. The “Rotten Kid Theorem”
of Becker (1974) would be reestablished in that case.
31For a formal analysis of this claim, see Pavoni and Yazici (2015) Section 11.E.
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This is the question we pick up in this section. As we will see below, we find that, as long as
the parents do not have access to a portfolio of assets that allows them to target transfers to
each and every period of the offsprings’ life cycle, transfer taxation remains optimal.
We use the multiperiod environment laid out in Section 5.3 for our analysis. To make
things simple, suppose people are not allowed to borrow at all. Suppose further that in
addition to inter vivos transfers and bequests, parents can use an illiquid asset to transfer
resources directly to period t + 2. Let bot+2 denote the amount of this illiquid bequest where
the subscript refers to the period in which the child receives the bequest. Suppose the return
to this asset is Rt+1Rt+2. The budget constraints then are
cot = Rtbt − dt − bot+1 − bot+2,
ct = dt + wt − bt+1,
ct+1 = Rt+1bt+1 + wt+1 + Rt+1bot+1 − bt+2,
ct+2 = Rt+2bt+2 + wt+2 + Rt+1Rt+2bot+2 − bt+3,
ct+i−1 = Rt+i−1bt+i−1 + wt+i−1 − bt+i, for 4 ≤ i ≤ I.
Let [bt+1(dt, Qt), bt+2(dt, bot+1, b
o
t+2, Qt)..., bt+I(dt, b
o
t+1, b
o
t+2, Qt)] denote the functions that de-
scribe how the offsprings’ savings choices over the life cycle depend on parental transfers
they receive.32
For the sake of argument, suppose that people do not have any labor income, meaning
wt = 0 for all t. In this case, one can show that parents use the transfers to keep offspring
borrowing constrained in periods t and t + 1. The intuition is simple. Suppose the offspring
is not constrained in period t in equilibrium. This means his optimal saving level bt+1 is
given by (30). Now, if the parent increases bequests and decreases inter vivos transfers in a
way that keeps the total amount of transfers unchanged, the offspring will have to decrease
his period t savings to keep his preferred allocation. If the parent continues to backload
transfers, there will be a point at which the offspring will completely deplete his savings
and will become borrowing constrained. From this point onward, back-loading of transfers
strictly increases parental welfare, and the parent does this until the equilibrium saving
32Notice that a change in illiquid bequests affects the offspring’s saving decisions in periods t + 1 and t + 2,
but not his saving decision in period t. This arises from our assumption that children learn the levels of both
liquid and illiquid bequests in period t, after they make their period t savings decision.
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behavior of the offspring is exactly in line with that of the parent:33
u′(ct) = δ
{ I−1
∑
i=1
δi−1u′(ct+i)
∂ct+i
∂bt+1
+ δI−1V1(at+I , Qt+I)Rt+I
∂bt+I
∂bt+1
}
, (34)
where the term ∂ct+i∂bt+1 is defined analogously to (29). Similarly, the parent uses liquid and
illiquid bequests to align offspring saving behavior with his own in period t + 1 :
u′(ct+1) = δ
{ I−1
∑
i=2
δi−2u′(ct+i)
∂ct+i
∂bt+2
+ δI−2V1(at+I , Qt+I)Rt+I
∂bt+I
∂bt+2
}
. (35)
The fact that the parent can control the offspring’s savings behavior in a period using the
timing of transfers implies that effectively there is no disagreement regarding that period’s
savings. As a result, there is no discrepancy between the parent’s and the planner’s optimal-
ity conditions regarding transfers, and hence, there is no need to distort transfers. For inter
vivos transfers, this can be seen by plugging (34) into the parental optimality condition for
inter vivos transfers, equation (28). For bequests, it can be shown by plugging (35) into the
parental optimality condition for bequests.
We now argue that even in this case, it is optimal to tax parental transfers: not inter vivos
transfers or bequests, but illiquid bequests. Notice that the parent does not have a long-
term asset that pays in period t + 3. As a result, the offspring saves according to his own
preference in periods t + 2 onward, meaning that for each i = 2, ..., I − 1, the offspring’s
saving satisfies (30). Plugging (34), (35), and (30) into the parent’s optimality condition
regarding illiquid bequests, we get34
u′(cot ) = γ
(
Rt+1Rt+2δ2u′(ct+2) + ∆t+2
)
, (36)
where
∆t+2 =
I−1
∑
i=2
δiu′(ct+i)
[
−1+ 1
βi+1
]
∂bt+i+1(dt, bot+1, Qt)
∂bot+2
.
As long as βi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ {3, ..., I} and βi < 1 for some i, ∆t+2 is strictly positive,
which means that illiquid bequest wedge is positive and therefore illiquid bequests should
33Notice that when wt > 0 and/or the offspring can borrow a positive amount, using the timing of transfers
to make the offspring save according to (34) might require leaving negative bequests.
34For an exact derivation of (36), see Appendix C.
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be taxed.
Intuitively, since the parent cannot directly transfer resources to period t + 3 (the fourth
period of the offspring’s life), there is no way to discipline period t + 2 savings of the off-
spring via the timing of transfers. Therefore, the parent has an additional return to illiquid
bequests (relative to the planner), and hence, the optimal tax on illiquid bequests is positive.
If there were a perfect set of long-term assets, {bot+i}Ii=1, available to the parent, only in that
case - and in the presence of liquidity constraints - would the parent be able to control the
offspring’s consumption completely and the optimality of transfer taxation would break.
6 Conclusion
We study the optimal taxation of parental transfers in a model where altruistic parents and
their offspring disagree on intertemporal trade-offs. We prove that laissez-faire equilibrium
is inefficient in a Pareto sense because of intergenerational disagreement. We focus on the
Ramsey allocation, the allocation that maximizes the welfare of the initial parent, as our
benchmark Pareto efficient allocation. We show that, if offspring are impatient from par-
ents’ perspective, Ramsey bequest wedge is positive, meaning it is optimal to tax bequests.
We then consider policies that target any point on the Pareto frontier of the economy. We
find that intergenerational disagreement again calls for a taxation of bequests. In this case,
there is another component of bequest taxation that comes from intergenerational redistri-
bution, and this component always asks for a subsidy on bequests. The sign of the bequest
tax depends on which component dominates. We also consider an economy with income
inequality across families in which the government wants to redistribute from the rich to the
poor. We find that if labor income taxes are distortionary and society puts direct weight on
future agents, then optimal bequest taxes may be progressive.
Finally, we show that the optimality of positive taxes on transfers remains valid even
when (i) we consider life cycles with arbitrarily long finite horizons and (ii) parents can
bequeath through long-term assets.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Before starting the proof, we demonstrate two preliminary lemmas that we use in the proof later on.
Lemma 11. The policy of the offspring bt+2(·, Qt+1) is increasing in the amount of bequests received, and the
value function V(·, Qt) is strictly increasing in wealth.
Proof. It is easy to see that V(·, Qt) is strictly increasing. A higher amount of assets enlarges the
constraint set of the parent with at least one allocation that strictly improves his welfare: the one in
which he consumes all the extra wealth in period t.
The monotonicity of bt+2(·, Qt+1) is shown as follows. The definition of the offspring’s saving
policy at bt+1 implies that, for ε > 0, we have
u(Rt+1bt+1 + wt+1 − bt+2 (bt+1, Qt+1))− u(Rt+1bt+1 + wt+1 − bt+2 (bt+1 + ε, Qt+1)) (37)
≥ βδ[V(Rt+2bt+2 (bt+1 + ε, Qt+1) + wt+2, Qt+2)−V (Rt+2bt+2 (bt+1, Qt+1) + wt+2, Qt+2)].
Using the definition of the policy for the offspring at bt+1 + ε, we have
u(Rt+1 (bt+1 + e) + wt+1 − bt+2 (bt+1, Qt+1))− u(Rt+1 (bt+1 + ε) + wt+1 − bt+2 (bt+1 + ε, Qt+1)) (38)
≤ βδ[Rt+2V(bt+2 (bt+1 + ε, Qt+1) + wt+2, Qt+2)−V (Rt+2bt+2 (bt+1, Qt+1) + wt+2, Qt+2)].
Combining (37) and (38), we get
u(Rt+1bt+1 + wt+1 − bt+2 (bt+1, Qt+1))− u(Rt+1bt+1 + wt+1 − bt+2 (bt+1 + ε, Qt+1)) (39)
≥ u(Rt+1 (bt+1 + ε) + wt+1 − bt+2 (bt+1, Qt+1))− u(Rt+1 (bt+1 + ε) + wt+1 − bt+2 (bt+1 + ε, Qt+1)).
Assume for the sake of contradiction that bt+2(bt+1 + ε, Qt+1) < bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1). Combined with
strict concavity of u, this contradicts with (39). Thus, it must be that bt+2(bt+1+ ε, Qt+1) ≥ bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1).
Lemma 12. Suppose the value function V(·, Qt) is differentiable. Then, bt+2(·, Qt+1) is strictly monotone in
the amount of bequests received.
Proof. Because of the Inada assumption on the utility function, the solution to the offspring’s problem
stated in (2) must be interior. A necessary condition for the optimality of the offspring’s savings is
then
u′(Rt+1bt+1 + wt+1 − bt+2) = βδRt+1V1(Rt+2bt+2 + wt+2, Qt+2)Rt+2. (40)
Now suppose the offspring receives a higher level of bequests from the parent, bt+1 + x, where x > 0.
From Lemma 11 we know the offspring’s policy is weakly increasing. It would never be optimal
for the offspring to use all of the increase in his wealth for current consumption, however, since this
would not satisfy his necessary condition for optimality:
u′(Rt+1 (bt+1 + x) + wt+1 − bt+2) < βδRt+1V1(Rt+2bt+2 + wt+2, Qt+2)Rt+2,
which follows from (40) and the strict concavity of the utility function.
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Proof. (Core Proof of Proposition 1) In the proof of this proposition, we use monotonicity of bt+2 (·, Qt+1)
and strict monotonicity of V (·, Qt) , which we establish in Lemma 11.
Consider first the case with β < 1. Assume for the sake of finding a contradiction that in equilib-
rium
− u′ (Rtbt + wt − bt+1) + γRt+1u′ (Rt+1bt+1 + wt+1 − bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1)) > 0. (41)
We want to show that there is a small positive ε > 0 such that
u(Rtbt+wt−bt+1−ε)+γ
[
u (Rt+1(bt+1 + ε) + wt+1 − bt+2(bt+1 + ε, Qt+1)) + δV (Rt+2bt+2(bt+1 + ε, Qt+1) + wt+2, Qt+2)
]
> u (Rtbt + wt − bt+1) + γ
[
u (Rt+1bt+1 + wt+1 − bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1)) + δV (Rt+2bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1) + wt+2, Qt+2)
]
.
Since u is a differentiable function, for ε sufficiently small, under the assumption (41), we have
u (Rtbt + wt − bt+1 − ε) + γu (Rt+1(bt+1 + ε) + wt+1 − bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1))
> u (Rtbt + wt − bt+1) + γu (Rt+1bt+1 + wt+1 − bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1)) .
Then, we have
u(Rtbt+wt−bt+1− ε)+γ
[
u (Rt+1(bt+1 + ε) + wt+1 − bt+2(bt+1 + ε, Qt+1)) + δV (Rt+2bt+2(bt+1 + ε, Qt+1) + wt+2, Qt+2)
]
≥ u (Rtbt + wt − bt+1 − ε) + γ
[
u (Rt+1(bt+1 + ε) + wt+1 − bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1)) + βδV (Rt+2bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1) + wt+2, Qt+2)
+(1− β)δV (Rt+2bt+2(bt+1 + ε, Qt+1) + wt+2, Qt+2)
]
> u (Rtbt + wt − bt+1) + γ
[
u (Rt+1bt+1 + wt+1 − bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1)) + βδV (Rt+2bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1) + wt+2, Qt+2)
+(1− β)δV (Rt+2bt+2(bt+1 + ε, Qt+1) + wt+2, Qt+2)
]
≥ u (Rtbt + wt − bt+1) + γ
[
u (Rt+1bt+1 + wt+1 − bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1)) + βδV (Rt+2bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1) + wt+2, Qt+2)
+(1− β)δV (Rt+2bt+2(bt+1, Qt+1) + wt+2, Qt+2) ,
]
where the first inequality follows from the definition of the policy bt+2 (·, Qt+1) and the monotonicity
of both bt+2(·, Qt+1) and V (·, Qt) , the second inequality follows from (41) and the differentiability of
the utility function u as discussed earlier, and the last one from the monotonicity of both bt+2(·, Qt+1)
and V (·, Qt) and the fact that β < 1. It is now easy to see that the last row will have a strict inequality
whenever the policy bt+2(·, Qt+1) is strictly monotone, since V is actually strictly increasing. In this
case, following the same line of proof, we can show a contradiction to the weak inequality version of
(41).
The case of β > 1 can be shown in an identical way. The case of β = 1 is trivial.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We start the proof with a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 13. Let {ct, kt}∞t=0 be an equilibrium allocation. Let cs+1 and cs+2 be the consumption of an agent in
his two years of life (with cs+1 consumption when young and cs+2 when a parent), and let bs+2 be the agent’s
level of saving from period s+ 1 to s+ 2, which is equal to the equilibrium the level of capital generated in that
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period, ks+2. Then, the following condition has to hold in equilibrium:
−u′(cs+1) + βδ f ′(ks+2)u′(cs+2) = 0.
Proof. Recall that in the equilibrium allocation, offspring’s decisions are interior due to the Inada
condition. Notice also that the offspring is choosing both bs+2 and bs+3. In particular, the offspring
can always consider the usual Euler perturbation. The optimal choice of bs+2 must be such that there
is no feasible deviation around bt+2 (keeping both bs+1 and bs+3 unchanged) that improves over the
equilibrium level of bt+2. The offspring’s optimal decision must be such that the problem
max
xˆ∈O
u (Rs+1bs+1 + ws+1 − bs+2 − xˆ) + δβu (Rs+2(bs+2 + xˆ) + ws+2 − bs+3) ,
where O is an open interval around zero, has the solution xˆ∗ = 0. Since u(·) is differentiable, and
recalling that Rs+2 = f ′(ks+2) and bs+2 = ks+2, the necessary condition for xˆ∗ = 0 to be optimal is the
first-order condition displayed in the statement of the lemma.
Proof. (Core Proof of Proposition 2) We will prove the statement for the case β < 1. The proof of the case
of β > 1 is symmetric and will be sketched at the end of this proof. For notational simplicity, we will
make the perturbation for consumption in periods 0,1, and 2. Define a perturbation by cˆ0 = c0 − ε,
cˆ1 = c1 + f (k1 + ε)− f (k1)− η, and cˆ2 = c2 + f (k2 + η)− f (k2), where ε, η > 0.
We will show that there exist ε and η such that this perturbation makes both the initial parent
and the agent who is born in period 1 strictly better off. The welfare of future generations will not
be altered, since the perturbation only involves periods 0,1, and 2. First, we show that the offspring’s
welfare increases. We aim at showing that u(c1 + f (k1 + ε) − f (k1) − η) + δβu(c2 + f (k2 + η) −
f (k2)) − [u(c1) + δβu(c2)] > 0. Letting ε = ξη with ξ > 0 to be chosen, the same condition is
equivalent to itself divided by the positive number η. So, for η > 0 we have
u (c1 + f (k1 + ξη)− f (k1)− η) + δβu (c2 + f (k2 + η)− f (k2))− [u(c1) + δβu(c2)] > 0
⇐⇒
u (c1 + f (k1 + ξη)− f (k1)− η) + δβu (c2 + f (k2 + η)− f (k2))− [u(c1) + δβu(c2)]
η
> 0.
Since u(·) and f (·) are differentiable, we have
u (c1 + f (k1 + ξη)− f (k1)− η) + δβu (c2 + f (k2 + η)− f (k2))− [u(c1) + δβu(c2)]
=
[
(ξ f ′(k1)− 1)u′(c1) + δβ f ′(k2)u′(c2)
]
η +O(η)η,
where, by definition of the remainder O(·) (as the right derivative exists),
lim
η→0+,η>0
O(η) = 0.
Hence, for η∗ > 0 small enough we have
[(ξ f ′(k1)− 1)u′(c1) + δβ f ′(k2)u′(c2)] η∗
η∗
+O(η∗) = ξ f ′(k1)u′(c1) +O(η∗) > 0,
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where we use Lemma 13.35
Next, we compute the change in welfare for the parent. Recall, ε = ξη. Set
l := max
{
u′(c0)− γδβ f ′(k1) f ′(k2)u′(c2), (1− β) f ′(k2)γδu′(c2)
}
> 0,
ξ :=
(1− β)γδ f ′(k2)u′(c2)
1+ l
∈ (0, 1).
Then, since u(·) and f (·) are differentiable, following the same argument as earlier, we can find a
small enough η such that
u(c0 − ξη) + γu (c1 + f (k1 + ξη)− f (k1)− η) + γδu (c2 + f (k2 + η)− f (k2))− [u(c0) + γu(c1) + γδu(c2)]
η
> 0
if and only if
−ξu′(c0) + γ(ξ f ′(k1)− 1)u′(c1) + γδ f ′(k2)u′(c2) > 0.
But the latter inequality must be true since we have
−ξu′(c0) + γ(ξ f ′(k1)− 1)u′(c1) + γδ f ′(k2)u′(c2)
= −ξ [u′(c0)− γβδ f ′(k1) f ′(k2)u′(c2)]+ (1− β)γδ f ′(k2)u′(c2) > 0.
The equality between the first and second rows uses Lemma 13 to replace u′(c1) for βδ f ′(k2)u′(c2)
and rearranging terms, whereas the last inequality comes from our definition of ξ and l, which di-
rectly implies ξ [u′(c0)− γβδ f ′(k1) f ′(k2)u′(c2)] < (1− β)γδ f ′(k2)u′(c2).
For the case β > 1, define a perturbation by cˆ0 = c0 − ε, cˆ1 = c1 + f (k1 + ε) − f (k1) + η, and
cˆ2 = c2 + f (k2 − η) − f (k2). Following the same steps as earlier, for small η > 0, the change in
offspring welfare again reduces to (disregarding the remainder O(η) since it goes to 0 as η goes to 0)
u′(c1)ξ f ′(k1), which is strictly positive. The change in parental welfare reduces to
−ξ [u′(c0)− γβδ f ′(k1) f ′(k2)u′(c2)]+ (β− 1)γδ f ′(k2)u′(c2) > 0,
which is strictly positive, since both of the terms in this expression are positive and at least one of
them is strictly positive.
A.3 CEIS utility functions
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Given any joint sequence of prices and taxes Ψ, let
Γs(b) = Rs(1− τs)b + ws + Ts + Gs
be the net present value of wealth as of the beginning of period s of an agent who saved b units in the
35To see in more detail why we can guarantee the existence of such η∗, recall that the definition of O(·)
implies that for all ζ > 0 we can find a ψ > 0 such that for all η < ψ we have |O(η∗)| < ζ. Thus, since
ξ f ′(k1)u′(c1) > 0, we can find 0 < ζ∗ < ξ f ′(k1)u′(c1) such that for all 0 < η∗ < ψ∗ the requirement is
satisfied.
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previous period (of course, we only consider prices and taxes such that this sum converges), where
Gs denotes the net present value of wages and lump-sum taxes from period s + 1 onward:
Gs =
∞
∑
m=1
ws+m + Ts+m
Πmn=1Rs+n(1− τs+n)
=
ws+1 + Ts+1 + Gs+1
Rs+1(1− τs+1) .
We will construct an equilibrium in which agents’ policies are linear in the current net present value
of wealth. We do so in three steps.
Step 1.
We first guess that the value function of the parent has the form
V(Rs(1− τs)b + ws + Ts,Ψs) = Vˆ(Γs(b),Ψs),
where Vˆ is homogeneous of degree 1− ρ ≤ 1 in period s net present value of wealth, that is,
Vˆ(λΓs(b),Ψs) = λ1−ρVˆ(Γs(b),Ψs), ∀ λ > 0.
Step 2.
We now show that, given this guess about the value function, the consumption policy of period s
is linear in Γs(b) for each period s. In Step 3, we will verify that this policy indeed generates a value
function that has homogeneity of degree 1− ρ in Γs(b).
We proceed by backward induction. Consider the problem of an offspring in period s + 1.
Claim 1.
cˆs+1 solves max u(cs+1) + βδVˆ(Γs+2(bs+2),Ψs+2) s.t. cs+1 + bs+2 = Γs+1(bs+1)− Gs+1
if and only if
λcˆs+1 solves max u(cs+1) + βδVˆ(Γs+2(bs+2),Ψs+2) s.t. cs+1 + bs+2 = λΓs+1(bs+1)− Gs+1.
First we show that the budget constraint is homogeneous of degree 1 in consumption and the net
present value of wealth. To do so, let Γs+1(bˆs+1), be the period s+ 1 net present value of wealth when
Γs(bs) is the period s net present value of wealth and the period s consumption choice is cˆs. Now
we show that when the period s wealth is λΓs(bs) and the agent consumes λcˆs in period s, then the
period s+ 1 net present value of wealth will be λΓs+1(bs+1). First, observe that period s saving in the
latter case is given by
[λΓs(bs)− Gs − λcˆs] .
Plugging this value into the definition of the net present value of wealth for period s + 1, we get
Rs+1(1− τs+1) [λΓs(bs)− Gs − λcˆs] + ws+1 + Ts+1 + Gs+1
= λΓs(bs)Rs+1(1− τs+1)− λcˆsRs+1(1− τs+1)− GsRs+1(1− τs+1) + Ts+1 + Gs+1
= λ [Γs(bs−1)Rs(1− τs)− cˆsRs(1− τs)]
= λΓs+1(bˆs+1).
Suppose cˆs+1 solves
max u(cs+1) + βδVˆ(Γs+2(bs+2),Ψs+2)
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s.t. cs+1 + bs+2 = Γs+1(bs+1)− Gs+1, and for the sake of contradiction suppose λcˆs+1 does not solve
sup u(cs+1) + βδVˆ(Γs+2(bs+2),Ψs+2)
s.t. cs+1 + bs+2 = λΓs+1(bs+1)− Gs+1. Let v∗ be the solution of the previous supremum problem and
define
κ := v∗ −
[
u(λcˆs+1) + βδVˆ(λΓs+2(bˆs+2),Ψs+2)
]
> 0.
Under our assumptions, for each ε > 0 there is a feasible c¯εs+1 such that
u(c¯εs+1) + βδVˆ(Γs+2(b¯
ε
s+2),Ψs+2) > u(λcˆs+1) + βδVˆ(λΓs+2(bˆs+2),Ψs+2) + κ − ε,
where b¯εs+2 is adjusted so as to maintain feasibility. By homogeneity of the utility and value functions,
for all λ > 0 the previous statement is equivalent to
u
(
c¯εs+1
λ
)
+ βδVˆ
(
Γs+2(b¯εs+2)
λ
,Ψs+2
)
> u(cˆs+1) + βδVˆ
(
Γs+2(bˆs+2),Ψs+2
)
+
κ − ε
λ
.
We also know that if c¯εs+1 and Γs+2(b¯
ε
s+2) are feasible in the problem of the agent facing wealth
λΓs+1(bs+1), so are
c¯εs+1
λ and
Γs+2(b¯εs+2)
λ in the problem of the agent facing Γs+1(bs+1). Setting ε
∗ = κ2 > 0,
we obtain a contradiction since c¯
ε∗
s+1
λ and
Γs+2(b¯ε
∗
s+2)
λ are feasible and give strictly higher utility to the
agent’s problem in year s. The converse of the claim is shown symmetrically.
Now, we prove the second step in the backward induction.
Claim 2.
(cˆs, cˆs+1) solves max u(cs) + γ
[
u(cs+1) + δVˆ(Γs+2(bs+2),Ψs+2)
]
s.t. (1) cs + bs+1 = Γs(bs)− Gs and (2) cs+1 solves agent’s problem in year s + 1
if and only if
(λcˆs,λcˆs+1) solves max u(cs) + γ
[
u(cs+1) + δVˆ(Γs+2(bs+2),Ψs+2)
]
s.t. (3) cs + bs+1 = λΓs(bs)− Gs and (4) cs+1 solves agent’s problem in year s + 1.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that (cˆs, cˆs+1) solves the corresponding problem but (λcˆs,λcˆs+1)
does not. Since the proof follows the same principle as that in the proof of Claim 1, to save notation,
we now propose the proof assuming the existence of a solution for both problems. This assumption
is not needed, as we have shown. Then, there exists a (c¯s, c¯s+1) such that
u(c¯s) + γ
[
u(c¯s+1) + δVˆ(Γs+2(b¯s+2),Ψs+2)
]
> u(λcˆs) + γ
[
u(λcˆs+1) + δVˆ(λΓs+2(bˆs+2),Ψs+2)
]
,
and (3) and (4) are satisfied. By homogeneity of the utility and value functions, we have
u
(
c¯s
λ
)
+ γ
[
u
(
c¯s+1
λ
)
+ δVˆ
(
Γs+2
(
b¯s+2
)
λ
,Ψs+2
)]
> u (cˆs) + γ
[
u (cˆs+1) + δVˆ(Γs+2(bˆs+2),Ψs+2)
]
.
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Furthermore, as we have shown in the first step of the induction, if c¯s+1 solves the problem in year
s + 1 under Γs+1(b¯s+1), then
c¯s+1
λ solves the same problem under
Γs+1(b¯s+1)
λ . This means that
(
c¯s
λ ,
c¯s+1
λ
)
is in the constraint set of the agent’s problem in year s, which, combined with the fact that it gives
strictly higher welfare than the equilibrium allocation, implies a contradiction.
Step 3.
Now, we verify that, under consumption policies that are linear in the current wealth, the value
function is in fact homogeneous of degree 1− ρ in Γ, as assumed:
V(λΓs(b),Ψs) = u(λcˆs) + γ
[
u(λcˆs+1) + δV(λΓs+2(bˆs+2),Ψs+2)
]
=
(λcˆs)1−ρ
1− ρ γ
[
(λcˆs+1)1−ρ
1− ρ + λ
1−ρδV(Γs+2(bˆs+2),Ψs+2)
]
= λ1−ρ
{
u(cˆs) + γ
[
u(cˆs+1) + δV(Γs+2(bˆs+2),Ψs+2)
]}
= λ1−ρV(Γs(b),Ψs).
To complete the proof, observe that we have shown that consumption defined as a function of
the net present value of wealth, prices, and taxes, denoted by cs(Γs(b),Ψs), satisfies the following
homogeneity of degree one in wealth: cs(λΓs(b),Ψs) = λcs(Γs(b),Ψs). In particular this implies
cs(Γs(b),Ψs) = Γs(b)cs(1,Ψs), which means consumption is a linear function of wealth with a con-
stant multiplier of cs(1,Ψs). Using the homogeneity of the value function, we can show that the value
function has the following simple form as a function of wealth: V(Γs(b),Ψs) = Γs(b)1−ρV(1,Ψs). This
ends the proof. Note in particular that since we are driving conditions for an equilibrium, no verifi-
cation stage is needed.
A.4 The Logarithmic Case
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. In the first step, for logarithmic utility, we compute a closed
form solution for the equilibrium linear consumption policy as a function of the net present value of
wealth and tax-price sequence. In the second step, we use the consumption policy computed in step
1 to compute M∗t+2 and plug that into the tax formula in Proposition 5.
Step 1. We use the guess and verify method to compute the value and policy functions. First, re-
member from the proof of Proposition 6 that, given any joint sequence of taxes and prices Ψ, we can
write the parent’s value function as a function of his current net present value of wealth Vˆ(Γt (bt) ,Ψt),
where Γt (bt) represents the current net present value of wealth of a parent who saved bt units dur-
ing his young adulthood in period t − 1. (Observe that in fact Γt(bt) also depends on the tax-price
sequence Ψt; however, we omit this to make this dependence explicit in order to ease notation.) Now,
we guess that the value function has the following form:
Vˆ(Γt (bt) ,Ψt) = D log(Γt (bt)) + B(Ψt),
where D is the constant of the parent’s value function.
By assumption we are interested in equilibria where policies are linear in the net present value of
wealth. Therefore, let consumption in period t under wealth Γt(bt) be given by
ct(Γt(bt),Ψt) = Ct(Ψt)Γt(bt),
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where Ct(Ψt) is the fraction of wealth consumed by agent under Ψt. In what follows, we omit the
dependence of Ct on Ψt in order to ease notation. Using linearity of the policy functions, we can
rewrite the parent’s problem as
Vˆ (Γt (bt) ,Ψt) = max
Ct
u (CtΓt (bt)) + γ[u (Ct+1Γt+1 (bt+1)) + δVˆ (Γt+2 (bt+2) ,Ψt+2)] (42)
s.t.
u′ (Ct+1Γt+1 (bt+1)) = δβVˆ1 (Γt+2 (bt+2) ,Ψt+2) Rt+2(1− τt+2). (43)
Notice that the net present value of wealth in two consecutive periods is linked as follows:
Γt+1 (bt+1) = Rt+1(1− τt+1)bt+1 + wt+1 + Tt+1 + Gt+1
= Rt+1(1− τt+1) [Rt(1− τt)bt + wt + Tt − CtΓt (bt)] + wt+1 + Tt+1 + Gt+1
= Rt+1(1− τt+1)
[
Rt(1− τt)bt + wt + Tt − CtΓt (bt) + wt+1 + Tt+1 + Gt+1Rt+1(1− τt+1)
]
= Rt+1(1− τt+1) [Rt(1− τt)bt + Tt − CtΓt (bt) + Gt]
= Rt+1(1− τt+1)Γt (bt) [1− Ct] . (44)
Plugging the value function guess into the constraint of the planning problem, (43), and using u(·) =
log, we get
(Ct+1Γt+1 (bt+1))
−1 =
δβRt+2(1− τt+2)D
Γt+2 (bt+2)
=
δβRt+2(1− τt+2)D
Rt+2(1− τt+2)(1− Ct+1)Γt+1 (bt+1) ,
where the second equality follows from the relationship between consecutive wealth levels that we
just established. This implies (Ct+1)
−1 = δβD
(1−Ct+1) or Ct+1(D) =
1
1+δβD . Taking the first-order condi-
tion with respect to Ct in the parent’s problem and again using (44), we get Ct(D) = 11+γ(1+δD) .
Now we verify the value function to compute D :
D log(Γt (bt))+ B(Ψt) = log (Ct(D)Γt (bt))+γ[log(Ct+1(D)Γt+1 (bt+1))+ δ{D log(Γt+2 (bt+2))+ B(Ψt+2)}],
which, using (44) and comparing the coefficients of log(Γt (bt)) on both sides of the previous equa-
tion, implies D = 1+γ1−γδ .
Step 2. Remember that bt+2(bt+1,Ψt+1) = Rt+1(1 − τt+1)bt+1 + wt+1 + Tt+1 − Ct+1Γt+1(bt+1).
Thus, we get
M∗t+2 ≡
dbt+2(bt+1,Ψt+1)
dbt+1
= Rt+1(1− τt+1)− Ct+1Rt+1(1− τt+1) = Rt+1(1− τt+1) δβD1+ δβD . (45)
Plugging this M∗t+2 value into the tax formula in Proposition 5 and doing some simple manipulation,
we get the result.
Proof of Proposition 8 We first prove Proposition 14, which is of independent interest and is used
for our computations in Table 2.
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Proposition 14. Suppose u(c) = log(c) and for t ≥ 0, ft(k) = Rtk + wt, with Rt > 0. The Ramsey
allocation Pareto improves over the laissez-faire market equilibrium allocation if and only if
log
(
(1− γδ)(1+ γ− δ+ βδ)
(1+ γ)(1− γδβ− δ+ βδ)
)
+ log A + log(1− δ+ βδ)B− log(β)C ≥ 0, (46)
where A = 1+
βδ
1− γδ (1+ γ), B = 1+
βδ
1− γδ (
1+ γ
1− γδ + γ), C =
βδ
1− γδ (
1+ γ
1− γδ ).
Proof. Step 1. We first compute the Ramsey allocation. The Euler equations that characterize the
Ramsey equilibrium are: for t = 0, 2, 4, ..., u′(c∗t ) = γRt+1u′(c∗t+1) and u
′(c∗t+1) = δRt+2u
′(c∗t+2). Since
utility is logarithmic, this implies that for t = 0, 2, 4, ..., we have c∗t+1 = c
∗
t xt+1 and c
∗
t+2 = c
∗
t+1yt+2,
where xt+1 = γRt+1 and yt+2 = δRt+2. Thus, we can write: c∗1 = c
∗
0 x1, c
∗
2 = c
∗
0 x1y2, c
∗
3 = c
∗
0 x1y2x3,
c∗4 = c
∗
0 x1y2x3y4, and so on. Using these to replace all consumption levels for t ≥ 1 with c∗0 , we get
c∗0
(
1+
x1
R1
+
x1y2
R1R2
+
x1y2x3
R1R2R3
+
x1y2x3y4
R1R2R3R4
+ ...
)
= R0b0 + w0 +
w1
R1
+
w2
R1R2
+ ... ≡ Γ,
which after plugging in values of xt+1 and yt+2 gives c∗0(1+ γ+ γδ+ γ2δ+ γ2δ2 + ...) = Γ, implying
c∗0 = Γ
1− γδ
1+ γ
.
Step 2. Next, we compute the laissez-faire equilibrium allocation, which we denote below by a hat.
The Euler equations that characterize equilibrium are: for t = 0, 2, 4, ...
u′(cˆt) =
γR
1− δ+ βδu
′(cˆt+1) and u′(cˆt+1) = βδRu′(cˆt+2).
Since utility is logarithmic, this implies that for t = 0, 2, 4, ..., we have cˆt+1 = cˆt xˆt+1 and cˆt+2 =
cˆt+1yˆt+1, where xˆt+1 =
γR
1−δ+βδ and yˆt+2 = βδR. Following what we did while computing the Ramsey
allocation, we find that
cˆ0 = Γ
1− δ+ βδ− βγδ
1− δ+ βδ+ γ .
Step 3. Now we compare the welfare of all generations under the two allocations and find the restric-
tions on parameters under which Ramsey improves welfare for all.
Notice that the Ramsey allocation strictly increases the initial old’s welfare over laissez-faire since
by definition the Ramsey allocation is the unique allocation that maximizes the initial old’s welfare.
We need to find when it improves over laissez-faire for the rest of the agents.
Let us first check the agent who is born in period 1. Denote his utility under the Ramsey allocation
by U1RA and that under the laissez-faire equilibrium by U
1
LF :
U1RA = log(c
∗
0 x1) + βδ[log(c
∗
0 x1y2) + γ log(c
∗
0 x1y2x3) + γδ log(c
∗
0 x1y2x3y4) + ...]
U1LF = log(cˆ0 xˆ1) + βδ[log(cˆ0 xˆ1yˆ2) + γ log(cˆ0 xˆ1yˆ2 xˆ3) + γδ log(cˆ0 xˆ1yˆ2 xˆ3yˆ4) + ...]
Agent 1 is better off under the Ramsey allocation if and only if U1RA ≥ U1LF. But this difference can
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be computed as follows:
U1RA −U1LF = [log(c∗0)− log(cˆ0)]A + [log(γ)− log(
γ
1− δ+ βδ )]B + [log(δ)− log(βδ)]C, (47)
where
A = 1+ βδ[1+ γ+ γδ+ γ2δ+ γ2δ2 + ...],
B = 1+ βδ[1+ 2γ+ 2γδ+ 3γ2δ+ 3γ2δ2 + ...],
C = βδ[1+ γ+ 2γδ+ 2γ2δ+ 3γ2δ2 + ...].
Simple algebra shows these values of A, B and C are equal to the ones stated in Proposition 14.
Plugging in the values of c∗0 and cˆ0, condition (47) becomes
U1RA −U1LF = A log D + B log(1− δ+ βδ)− C log β, (48)
where D = (1−γδ)(1+γ−δ+βδ)
(1+γ)(1−γδβ−δ+βδ) . Since neither the Ramsey nor the laissez-faire allocations are assumed
to be stationary, the fact that agent 1 is better off under the Ramsey allocation does not imply that
future generations are better off too. Now, we show that condition (48) guarantees that agents born
in future generations are better off under the Ramsey allocation as well. Let us first look at the agent
born in period 3.
U3RA = log(c
∗
0 x1y2x3) + βδ[log(c
∗
0 x1y2x3y4) + γ log(c
∗
0 x1y2x3y4x5) + ...]
= U1RA + log(y2x3) + βδ[log(x3y4) + γ log(x4y5) + ...].
Similarly, U3LF = U
1
LF + log(yˆ2 xˆ3) + βδ[log(xˆ3yˆ4) + γ log(xˆ4yˆ5) + ...]. After some algebra, we reach
U3RA −U3LF = U1RA −U1LF + [log(γδ)− log(
γδβ
1− δ+ βδ )]A
= U1RA −U1LF − log(
β
1− δ+ βδ )A
> U1(x, y)−U1(xˆ, yˆ),
since β1−δ+βδ < 1. Thus, we have shown that condition (48) guarantees that agent 3 is better off under
the Ramsey allocation. In a similar way, one can show that for any t odd, Ut(x, y) − Ut(xˆ, yˆ) >
U1(x, y)−U1(xˆ, yˆ), ending the proof.
Core Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. The statement of the proposition 8 considers a special case of Proposition 14 with Rt = R > 0,
wt = w ≥ 0, and γ = δ. When γ = δ, the condition in Proposition 14 for the Ramsey allocation to be
54
Pareto improving becomes
log(1− δ+ βδ)[1+ βδ
1− δ (1+
δ
1− δ2 )]− log(β)
βδ
1− δ
1
1− δ2 ≥ 0.
At no β ∈ (0, 1), a limit exists for the prior expression as δ → 1. But the left- and right-hand limits
exist. Since we are interested in the value as δ approaches 1 from below, the relevant limit is the
left-hand one, which is
lim
δ→1−
log(
1
1− δ+ βδ )[1+
βδ
1− δ (1+
δ
1− δ2 )] + log(β)
βδ
1− δ
1
1− δ2 = ∞.
Thus, we have proved the proposition.
B Horizontal Redistribution: Implementation
In this section, we provide a tax system that implements the Mirrleesian allocation for any λ ≥ 0 in a
market setup where people buy and sell bonds. If λ = 0, bequest taxes are flat. When λ > 1, bequest
taxes are progressive as long as the CEIS coefficient is weakly less than 1.
In the implementation exercise, the parent’s budget constraint is
c0 + b1 = R0b0 + y0 − Tb(b1) + T0(y0),
where labor income tax T0 is a function of the parent’s declaration and - by the taxation principle -
can always be written in terms of the (observable) period 0 income y0. The function Tb(·) represents
the bequest tax that is allowed to depend nonlinearly on the level of bequests b1 and, for notational
simplicity, is assumed to be paid by the parent.36 The offspring’s budget constraints are given by
c1 + b2 = R1(1− τ1(y0))b1 + y1 + T1(y0),
c2 = R2(1− τ2(y0))b2 + y2 + T2(y0),
where, for t = 1, 2, τt, and Tt represent wealth (or inheritance) taxes and labor income taxes, respec-
tively. As indicated, both labor and wealth taxes are allowed to depend on the initial income level y0
of the dynasty. We denote a tax scheme that implements the efficient allocation by(
{T∗t (·)}t=0,1,2, T∗b (·), τ∗1 (·), τ∗2 (·)
)
.
In this tax system, both Tb and τ1 are taxes on bequests, and we can obviously dispense with one of
them. In what follows, we set τ1 ≡ 0.
Proposition 15. Assume CEIS preferences and β < 1. Then, for any λ ≥ 0, there is a tax scheme that
implements the corresponding Pareto-efficient allocation. Moreover, (i) if λ = 0, then the bequest tax function
T∗b (·) is linear in b1. (ii) If λ > 0, then the bequest tax is progressive, that is, T∗b (·) convex, whenever ρ ≤ 1.
36As discussed in Farhi and Werning (2010), it is easy to see that any given bequest tax can be replaced by a
tax on the offspring (inheritance tax) with the same characteristics.
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Proof. In the proof of the proposition, we write all taxes that are functions of y0 as functions of skill
types, s. Since y∗0(s) increases with s, and hence, there is be a one-to-one relationship between y0 and
s, this is without loss of generality.
First, consider the problem of the parent. A parent who is endowed with asset level b0 = K0 and
skill level s, and declaring to be of skill σ, solves
V(σ|s) := max
{ct,bt}2t=0
u(c0)− v
(
y0(σ)
w0s
)
+ γ [u(c1) + δu(c2)]
s.t. c0 + b1 = R0b0 + y0(σ)− Tb(b1) + T0(σ);
b2 ∈ arg max
bˆ
u(cˆ1) + δβu(cˆ2); (49)
s.t. cˆ1 + bˆ = R1(1− τ1(σ))b1 + y1 + T1(σ);
cˆ2 = R2(1− τ2(σ))bˆ + y2 + T2(σ).
The definition of the offspring’s problem is given by (49) and therefore is not stated separately.
Definition. We say that a system of taxes implements a Pareto-efficient allocation
(
{c∗t (s)}t=0,1,2 , y∗0(s)
)
s∈S
if there exists a price system, (R∗t , w∗t )t=0,1,2, such that, at this price system and taxes, for each s we have
V(s|s) ≥ V(σ|s) for all σ and for each s the solution to V(s|s) is ({c∗t (s)}t=0,1,2 , y∗0(s)) and all markets clear.
The core of the implementation exercise follows the same logic as in Kocherlakota (2005). We
will show that for all s, a dynasty whose parent declares σ finds it optimal to choose the allocation
prescribed by the efficient allocation to type σ families, {c∗t (σ)}t=0,1,2 (and, of course, the parent is
forced to generate income y∗0(σ)). Once this key fact is shown, the inequality V(s|s) ≥ V(σ|s) is a
direct consequence of the incentive compatibility property of the Mirrleesian allocation.
Now, we construct the equilibrium price system and taxes. First, set R∗0 = FK(K∗0 , L∗0) + (1− θ)
and w∗0 = FL(K∗0 , L∗0) and for t = 1, 2, R∗t = FK(K∗t , 1) + (1− θ) and w∗t = FL(K∗t , 1). The taxes that
apply to the offspring are constructed as follows. For a given tax system and facing equilibrium
prices, the first-order optimality condition of the offspring’s problem in (49) is given by
u′(c1(s)) = (1− τ2(s))βδR∗2u′(c2(s)).
Since the offspring’s problem is strictly concave, this first-order optimality condition, together
with the budget constraints, is necessary and sufficient for the solution. We choose τ∗2 (s) to ensure
that the efficient allocation satisfies the offspring’s optimality condition:
τ∗2 (s) = 1−
u′(c∗1(s))
βδR∗2u′(c∗2(s))
. (50)
We choose the labor income taxes that the offspring faces such that the s component of the efficient
allocation is just affordable by the offspring whose parent has reported to be of type s. That is, we set
T∗1 (s) and T
∗
2 (s) such that
c∗1(s) +
c∗2(s)
R2(1− τ∗2 (s))
= y1 + T∗1 (s) +
y2 + T∗2 (s)
R∗2(1− τ∗2 (s))
+ R∗1b
∗
1(s).
The previous equation also pins down a value for b∗1(s) for given values of T
∗
1 (s) and T
∗
2 (s). Notice
that if we change the values of taxes the corresponding value of b∗1(s) will also change. In other
words, there is an indeterminacy regarding the choice of labor income taxes for periods 1 and 2. This
set of taxes for the offspring ensures that the offspring whose parent reported to be of type s chooses
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(c∗1(s), c
∗
2(s)).
Before proceeding to construct the parent’s taxes, we first compute the saving policy that comes
out of the offspring’s problem, (49), under these taxes. This is needed since the parent’s taxes, which
we will define later, depend on the derivative of the offspring’s saving policy function. Recall from
Proposition 6 that - with CEIS utility - the policy of the offspring is linear and increasing in wealth. We
now compute this policy explicitly.37 Let Mτ(s) :=
∂b2(·,ψ(s))
∂b1
be the derivative of the policy where ψ(s)
represents the joint sequence of prices (Rt, wt)t=1,2 and taxes (Tˆ1(s), Tˆ2(s), τ2(s)) that the offspring
faces. Notice that M is allowed to depend on s because the taxes the offspring faces potentially
depend on s. Plugging the period budget constraints of the offspring into their first-order optimality
condition for saving, for a given sequence of taxes and prices, the policy of the offspring solves
u′(c1) = δβR1(1− τ2)u′(c2)
⇐⇒
(R1(1− τ1)b1 + y1 + T1 − (Aτ + Mτb1))−ρ = δβR2(1− τ2) (R2(1− τ2)(Aτ + Mτb1) + y2 + T2)−ρ
⇐⇒
(R1(1− τ1)b1 + y1 + T1 − (Aτ + Mτb1)) = (δβR2(1− τ2))−
1
ρ (R2(1− τ2)(Aτ + Mτb1) + y2 + T2) ,
where Aτ and Mτ are the constants defining the policy and 1ρ is the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution. Since the previous relationship must hold for all b1, taking the derivative with respect to b1
on both sides, and evaluated at the efficient tax and price system τ∗1 (s), τ
∗
2 (s), R
∗
1 , R
∗
2 , we have
M∗τ(s) =
(1− τ∗1 (s))R∗1
(δβ)−
1
ρ (R∗2(1− τ∗2 (s)))1−
1
ρ + 1
. (51)
Now we construct the taxes on parents. The first-order optimality condition of a parent announc-
ing s is
u′(c0(s))
[
1+
∂Tb(b1(s))
∂b1
]
= γR∗1u
′(c1(s))
{
1− τ1(s) + Mτ(s)R∗1
[
1
β
− 1
] }
.
Since the parent’s problem is concave, this optimality condition evaluated at the correct offspring
policy derivative, given by (51), together with the parent’s first-period budget constraint, is necessary
and sufficient for a solution. Therefore, we set the Tb function so that the efficient allocation satisfies
the parental bequest optimality condition. This implies that
∂T∗b (b
∗
1(s))
∂b1
=
γR∗1u
′(c∗1(s))
u′(c∗0(s))
{
1+
M∗τ(s)
R∗1
[
1
β
− 1
] }
− 1, (52)
where we set the redundant τ∗1 (s) = 0.
Now we define the labor tax for the parent so that the parental period 0 budget constraint holds
with equality under the effiicient allocation, meaning we choose T∗0 (s) to satisfy
c∗0(s) + b∗1(s) = R
∗
0b0 + y
∗
0(s)− Tb(b∗1(s)) + T∗0 (s).
Under these taxes, the parents who report to be of type s choose the allocation that is intended
37Note that under the previous offspring problem, with CEIS utility and a budget linear in b1, the proof of
linearity of the policy is immediate.
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for family type s. Finally, notice that the actual level of skills does not enter into the intertemporal
budget constraints or the first-order optimality conditions of agents. This implies that for all s, a
parent declaring σ (possibly different from s) will find it optimal to choose the Mirrlees consumption
plan intended for σ type family, c∗t (σ), t = 0, 1, 2. Since the Mirrlees allocation is incentive compatible
the parents will actually tell the truth.
We are done with proving that the taxes defined implement the efficient allocation. Next we
derive the properties of taxes.
Properties of Optimal Bequest Taxes
We first compute the wealth tax on the offspring. To do so, we need to first derive the planner’s
optimality condition for the offspring’s savings. Consider the perturbation zε0(s) = z
∗
0(s), z
ε
1(s) =
z∗1(s) + ε, and z
ε
2(s) = z
∗
2(s) − εδ . Since the efficient allocation, denoted by the starred allocation,
solves the planning problem, ε = 0 must be the optimal level of perturbation, implying that
λ(1− β)− µ1
u′(c∗1(s))
+
µ1
δR∗2u′(c∗2(s))
= 0, (53)
which can be rearranged as
β− 1
β
(
λu′(c∗1(s))
µ1
− 1
)
=
u′(c∗1(s))
δβR∗2u′(c∗2(s))
− 1. (54)
Evaluating (54) in the optimal wealth tax expression given by (50), we get
τ∗2 (s) =
1− β
β
(
λu′(c∗1(s))
µ1
− 1
)
. (55)
Evaluating (25) in the optimal bequest tax expression given by (52), we get
∂T∗b (b
∗
1(s))
∂b1
=
{
1+ M
∗
τ(s)
R∗1
[
1
β − 1
] }
1+ λµ0γu
′(c∗0(s))
− 1. (56)
Case (i): λ = 0 (Ramsey allocation): From condition (55), τ∗2 (s) = 1− 1/β, which is independent of
s. This implies that M∗τ(s), given by (51), is independent of s. The optimal bequest tax given by (56)
reduces to
∂T∗b (b
∗
1(s))
∂b1
=
M∗τ
R∗1
[
1
β
− 1
]
> 0.
In words, the marginal tax on bequests is strictly positive and is flat in the amount bequeathed. In
fact, this tax expression is identical to the bequest tax of Proposition 5 in the baseline model without
horizontal heterogeneity.
Case (ii) λ > 0 : Notice first that when λ > 0, (55) implies that τ∗2 depends on s. Since c∗1(s)
increases with s and 0 < β < 1, τ∗2 (s) decreases with s. If ρ ≤ 1, this implies that M∗τ(s) is increasing in s.
Since c∗0(s) is increasing in s, in this case we get that the right-hand side of equation (56) is increasing
in s. If we show that b∗1(s) increases with s, we get a convex T
∗
b as claimed. To do so, we need to show
that in our implementation of the Pareto-efficient allocation, b∗1(s) increases with s. From the offspring
budget constraint at the efficient allocation and taxes, and recalling that Tˆ∗t (s) = τ∗t (s)R∗t b∗t (s), for all
s we have: c∗1(s)+ b
∗
2(s) = R
∗
1b
∗
1(s)+ y1 and c
∗
2(s) = R
∗
2b
∗
2(s)+ y2, which combined together generates
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c∗1(s) +
c∗2(s)
R∗2
= y1 +
y2
R∗2
+ R∗1b
∗
1(s).
Since, c∗1(s) and c
∗
2(s) are increasing in s then b
∗
1(s) must also increase with s. In fact, the value of b
∗
1(s)
is fully pinned down from this equation for all s.
C The Optimality Condition for Illiquid Bequests
In this section, we explicitly derive equation (36) in the main text, which is the optimality condition
for illiquid bequests. The first-order condition for illiquid bequests is given by
(bot+2) : u
′(cot ) = γδ
 u′(ct+1) [− dbt+2dbot+2 ]+ δu′(ct+2) [Rt+2 dbt+2dbot+2 + Rt+1Rt+2 − dbt+3dbot+2 ]
+∑I−1i=3 δ
i−1u′(ct+i)
∂ct+i
∂bot+2
+ δI−1V1(at+I , Qt+I)Rt+I ∂bt+I∂bot+2
 .
Observe that a change in illiquid bequests affects bt+3 both directly and indirectly through its effect
on bt+2 :
dbt+3
dbot+2
=
∂bt+3
∂bot+2
+
∂bt+3
∂bt+2
dbt+2
dbot+2
. (57)
Now, plugging (57) into the parent’s first-order condition for illiquid bequests and rearranging, we
get
u′(cot ) = γ
(
Rt+1Rt+2δ2u′(ct+2) + δ
∂bt+2
∂bot+2
Ξt+1 + δ2
∂bt+3
∂bot+2
Ξt+2
)
, (58)
where
Ξt+1 =
[
−u′(ct+1) + δ
(
I−1
∑
i=2
δi−2u′(ct+i)
∂ct+i
∂bt+2
+ δI−2V1(at+I , Qt+I)Rt+I
∂bt+I
∂bt+2
)]
, (59)
Ξt+2 =
[
−u′(ct+2) + δ
(
I−1
∑
i=3
δi−3u′(ct+i)
∂ct+i
∂bt+3
+ δI−3V1(at+I , Qt+I)Rt+I
∂bt+I
∂bt+3
)]
. (60)
Using (35) in (59), we get Ξt+1 = 0. Using (30), which describes the offspring’s optimality condition
for saving during periods i = 2, ..., I − 1, in (60), we get
Ξt+2 =
I−1
∑
t=2
δi−2u′(ct+i)
[
−1+ 1
βi+1
]
∂bt+i+1
∂bt+3
.
Plugging Ξt+1 and Ξt+2 into (58), we reach equation (36) in the text. 
59
